The Risk of Economic Crisis by Lawrence H. Summers et al.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Risk of Economic Crisis
Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-24090-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/feld91-2
Conference Date: October 17, 1989
Publication Date: January 1991
Chapter Title: Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Crises
Chapter Author: Lawrence H. Summers, Hyman P. Minsky, Paul A. Samuelson,
William Poole, Paul A. Volcker
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6231
Chapter pages in book: (p. 135 - 182)3  Macroeconomic 
Consequences of 
Financial Crises 
1. Lawrence H. Summers 
2. Hyman F!  Minsky 
3. Paul A. Samuelson 
4. William  Poole 
5. Paul A. Volcker 
1. Lawrence H. Summers 
Planning for the Next Financial Crisis 
It used to be said that a repeat of the depression of the 1930s was inconceiv- 
able now that governments better understood how to manage their economies. 
Yet,  both Latin America and Europe have suffered economic downturns dur- 
ing the  1980s on a scale comparable to the 1930s. And, in 1987, the world’s 
stock markets suffered  the greatest one-day drop in their history.  It is little 
wonder  that  the  possibility  of  financial crisis  with  major  economic  conse- 
quences has again emerged as a major cause for concern. 
The problem of planning for financial crisis has much in common with the 
problem of  planning for war. We are fortunate in that the worst disasters we 
can contemplate are much worse than those with which we have had experi- 
ence. While certain principles may be robust, technological changes reduce 
the relevance  of historical experience and create new threats.  With financial 
crisis as with war, prevention is much better than cure. But in neither case can 
prevention and cure be cleanly separated. Credible government commitments 
to  defend  financial institutions  can deter  speculative attack just as credible 
threats of  reprisal can discourage military attack. But, policies that deter at- 
tack  also encourage reckless  behavior.  Thus critics  argue  that  excessively 
strong military  force breeds  adventurism  and that excessively generous  de- 
The author is indebted to David Cutler for research assistance and to J. Bradford De Long for 
useful discussions. 
135 136  Lawrence H. Summers 
posit insurance leads financial institutions to take unwarranted and dangerous 
gambles. 
Because of  their inability  to do experiments, and the paucity of  relevant 
precedent, military planners make extensive use of war games. By following 
out the logic of various constructed scenarios, they evaluate the efficacy of 
alternative  strategies. I use  a  similar mode of  analysis here  in  considering 
appropriate government policy once financial crisis comes. For the most part, 
I ignore issues of maintaining a stable and sustainable policy environment and 
issues relating to the prudential regulation of financial institutions. Instead, I 
concentrate primarily  on lender-of-last-resort  strategies. Only  in  so  far as 
commitments made by lenders of last resort affect the likelihood of crisis do I 
touch on the issue of crisis prevention as opposed to crisis cure. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1  describes and tries to drama- 
tize the three stages of  the canonical “Kindleberger” (1978) crisis and consid- 
ers its relevance in the current environment. I conclude that technological and 
financial  innovation  have  probably  operated  to  make  speculative  bubbles 
which ultimately  burst more likely today than has been the case historically. 
However, other institutional  changes have made it less likely  that  financial 
disturbances will be transmitted  to the real economy. The most important are 
the presence of automatic stabilizers and deposit insurance, and the Federal 
Reserve’s recognition  of  the potentially  disastrous consequences of  a major 
decline in the money stock. 
Section 3.2 takes up the critical issue of lender-of-last-resort  policy. I dis- 
tinguish  four positions  on the appropriate  behavior of public lenders of  last 
resort. The first luissezlfuire  position, which  has enjoyed a mild revival  in 
recent years, holds that there is no reason for public intervention in financial 
markets, that private institutions could and would perform the lender-of-last- 
resort  function if  there  was no public  interference.  The second, monetarist 
position holds that the only appropriate role of the government is to insulate 
the money stock from developments in asset markets.  In large part, this can 
be  done through open  market operations directed  at  maintaining  a  stable 
money  stock without any need  for the authorities  to intervene on behalf of 
specific institutions. The third, classical position follows Bagehot ( 1873) in 
seeing a clear but limited role for a public lender of last resort. On the classical 
view, last-resort lending is appropriate only to solvent banks, at a penalty rate, 
for short time periods according to a preannounced plan. 
The fourth, pragmatic position is the one embraced implicitly if not explic- 
itly  by  policymakers in  most  major economies. It holds that  central  banks 
must always do whatever is necessary to preserve the integrity of the financial 
system regardless of  whether those who receive  support  are solvent or can 
safely pay a penalty rate. This position concedes that some institutions may 
become too large to fail. While lender-of-last-resort  insurance, like any other 
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small when contrasted with the benefits of protecting the real economy from 
financial disturbances. 
Section 3.3 asks how a financial crisis could affect the real economy in the 
presence of a sufficiently aggressive lender of last resort. This would be most 
likely if the provision of liquidity was itself destabilizing. Suppose foreigners 
lose confidence and rush to get out of dollar assets in U.S. financial institu- 
tions. Such a situation would be difficult for the authorities because the actions 
necessary to preserve the health of financial institutions would conflict with 
the goal of  preventing a currency collapse. Conversely, the high interest rates 
necessary to avert a collapsing  currency  would  tend to create financial dis- 
tress. 
Section 3.4 concludes by assessing the magnitude of the crisis risk and by 
suggesting steps that might make financial crisis less likely. 
3.1  The Canonical Crisis 
Perhaps the best definition of a financial crisis is the one offered by Gold- 
smith (1982) in commenting on Minsky (1982). He defines a financial crisis 
as “a sharp, brief,  ultra-cyclical  deterioration  of  all or most of  a group of 
financial indicators-short  term interest rates, asset prices, (stock, real estate, 
land) prices,  commercial insolvencies and failures of financial institutions.” 
On this definition, even very sharp declines in asset values such as the two- 
thirds decline in U.S.  real stock prices between the beginning of  1973 and 
summer of 1974  does not represent a financial crisis. Nor do widespread finan- 
cial institution failures such as the S&L crisis unless they occur suddenly and 
lead to widespread failures of financial institutions. 
On a narrow definition, the incidence of financial crisis has surely dimin- 
ished over time. After noting that “a disinflation or a deflation may be long 
drawn out. Nominal wealth may decline, real debts may rise, but these are not 
financial crisis,” Anna Schwartz (1986) goes so far as to claim that “no finan- 
cial crisis has occurred in the United States since 1933, and none has occurred 
in the United  Kingdom since 1866. All the phenomena of  recent years that 
have been characterised as financial crisis-a  decline in asset prices of equity 
stocks, real estate, commodities; depreciation of the exchange value of  a na- 
tional  currency; financial distress of a large non-financial  firm, a large mu- 
nicipality,  a  financial  industry,  or  sovereign  debtors-are  pseudo-financial 
crisis.” 
The issue of what constitutes a financial crisis is semantic. But Schwartz is 
clearly correct in her implication  that the financial  stresses of  recent  years 
have had relatively little effect on real economic activity. The situation is very 
different than that of a century ago, when financial panics and sharp declines 
in economic  activity often coincided. Perhaps the critical question about fi- 
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omy in the way that it once did, or whether in fact there is a risk that the next 
financial disturbance will turn out to have a major impact on the real economy. 
One way of trying to get some insight into this question is to try to construct 
a scenario where financial crisis leads to disaster and then to evaluate its plau- 
sibility. This should either lead to a rejection  of  Schwartz’s view  or to the 
identification of the crucial differences that make crises less likely today than 
they were in an earlier era. 
3.1.1  Prelude to Crisis 
Here is a scenario that poses many of the issues that come up in historical 
discussions of the onset of financial crisis. In this section, I use this scenario 
as a vehicle for expositing  Kindleberger’s model of the canonical crisis and 
considering its current relevance. Then in the next section, I use it as a vehicle 
for considering various positions about the appropriate behavior of the lender 
of  last resort.  Finally, in the third section, I consider possible new genres of 
financial crisis. It goes without saying that the scenario presented here is em- 
ployed as an analytic device and does not represent a forecast of the future in 
either broad outline or detailed particular. 
The year was  199  1. The world economy had been growing for 9 consecu- 
tive years. Widespread fears that the U.S. economy would land hard after 
the  twin  deficits of  the  Reagan  years  had  proven  false.  The notion  that 
recessions  were a thing of the past took hold. Analysts explained that be- 
cause of the increasing diversity and internationalization of economic activ- 
ity,  poor  performance  in  a  single  sector of  the  economy  was  no  longer 
enough to drag the whole economy down. They also argued that the market 
itself had supplanted the Fed as a controller of inflation. Whenever inflation 
loomed, interest rates rose automatically, slowing growth down to a sustain- 
able level. The competitive problems of the 1980s and the Reagan admin- 
istration’s anti-union policies exerted a continuous restraining influence on 
wage  demands, allowing  corporate profit  rates to rise to levels  not  seen 
since the 1960s. 
Reduced concern about inflation and strong earnings were good news for 
the stock market. Three other fundamental factors also buoyed the market. 
First, with the Nikkei index at 55000,  Japanese investors began to diversify 
on a large scale. At  last, the Tokyo offices of  major American  financial 
institutions began to pay off. Predictions that the flow of Japanese money 
into the American stock market would rise from $75 billion a year to $250 
billion a year by 2000 became commonplace. Second, junk bond investors 
who were fortunate enough to buy during the fall 1989 slump earned spec- 
tacular  returns. With  a vindicated  Michael Milken back in business,  the 
pace of corporate restructuring increased. Nearly $200 billion in equity was 
withdrawn  from  the  market  during  1990.  Third,  reduced  capital  gains 
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retary Brady 's corporate tax integration program,  and newly enacted IRA 
accounts also contributed to the demand for stocks. 
With  the  Dow  Jones average above 4000  by  1990, the small investor 
returned to the market. The argument that, over a 15-year period including 
the crash up to the end of 1990, investors in stocks had earned an average 
real return  of  11 percent, and that, with  a reduced cyclical element, the 
future would be even brighter, proved persuasive. With the baby bust of the 
1980s, fewer families needed to invest in purchasing a larger second home. 
Instead, the money went into stock market. Mini-stock-market  future con- 
tracts invented by a major brokerage firm that enabled individuals to put up 
just $2,000 and control $35,000 worth of stock were approved by the CFK 
and  proved  to be  a major hit. A  distinguished  group of economists  and 
financial experts convened early in 1990 and recommended that, given new 
economic realities, universities and other nonprofit institutions should hold 
75 percent of their endowments in equity, since over the long term if not the 
short term, the stock market  provided  an extremely  attractive risk return 
ratio. 
During the first half of 1991, the Dow Jones average rose from 4000 to 
4800. Investors in mini-stock-market futures saw their initial $2,000 stake 
rise to $9,000. Most reinvested their proceeds.  Lawyers and dentists ex- 
plained to one another that investing without margin was a mistake,  since 
using margin enabled one to double one's return, and the risks were small 
given that one could always sell out if it looked like the market would de- 
cline. By mid-September, the Dow had reached 5400. 
This account has the three major elements that Kindleberger stresses in his 
account of  the prelude to crisis.' First, there is a displacement,  a change in 
fundamental values that leads to a fully justified increase in asset prices. Here 
it  is an increase in earnings, and there is an appropriate expectation that the 
variability of economic performance may have decreased. Further arguments, 
(the Japanese, the tax cuts), lend support to the idea that an asset price in- 
crease is justified. 
Second, the increase in asset prices and the confidence it brings about leads 
to an increased use of leverage. This takes place both at the firm level, as firms 
lever themselves much more highly, and at the individual level, as the use of 
the futures markets permits individuals to lever their purchases of stock. In 
one description, this  increased  demand  for  credit  pushes  interest rates  up, 
leading to an increase in the velocity of money. In another, a proper definition 
of money should include the credit extended by brokerage firms to individuals 
and so the money  supply has increased.  Either conception suggests that the 
increase in asset values  leads to increased liquidity, which  in turn  increases 
the demand for goods and services and leads to economic expansion. 
1. Kindleberger's account places more emphasis than  this one on the presence of fraud and 
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Third, the boom is fueled by the positive feedback behavior of some inves- 
tors.*  Individuals who emulate the strategies that have fared well in the recent 
past, and so buy stock following price increases and sell following price de- 
clines, are displaying positive feedback behavior. So are the institutions who 
use recent history to set their investment strategy. Investors who rush to sell 
out when they get margin calls, or to cover short positions when the market 
moves up are also positive feedback investors. By increasing the demand for 
shares when prices are rising and reducing it when prices are falling, positive 
feedback behavior increases market volatility. 
Kindleberger is not entirely clear on what determines when good news is 
followed by enough use of leverage and enough positive feedback behavior to 
create a mania or a bubble.  Surely institutional factors matter. If  may also be 
that it takes a long run of good news to create enough confidence for conven- 
tional  inhibitions  about leverage to erode, and for sluggish households and 
institutions to get the word that a new era has begun. The accident of  what 
catches the public’s fancy is relevant as well. 
Has anything happened to make this sort of prelude to crisis less likely now 
than  it might  have  been  in earlier times? It seems unlikely.  First,  financial 
innovation has greatly increased the use of leverage in the economy. This may 
be seen in many ways. At the broadest level, the ratio of high-powered money 
(currency plus bank reserves) to GNP has fallen from 6.9 percent in the 1920s 
to 5.7 percent today, and much of today’s high-powered money is held outside 
the country. The ratio of household debt to disposable income has risen from 
36 percent to 92 percent today. The ratio of corporate debt to corporate equity 
has risen  sharply,  especially  in  recent years.  And  the importance  of  cross- 
border  lending  and borrowing  on both  a net  and gross  basis  has  increased 
spectacularly. 
Second, the Depression and even the sharp stock market declines of  1973- 
75 recede from memory. There was of course the crash in 1987, but the recent 
performance of  the American market and, even more strikingly, several for- 
eign markets, suggest that its lesson may have been double-edged. Some were 
scared away. But others concluded that a market that could prosper following 
the crash was basically sound and safe. While portfolio insurance strategies 
of the type that were popular before the crash have become less fashionable, 
little else has changed, and other types of market-timing strategies have taken 
their place. Recall  that  markets  crashed  in  other countries  where portfolio 
insurance was not in widespread use. 
Third, the steady decline in transaction  costs and the increase in trading 
volumes has surely increased the perception of liquidity in asset markets. The 
perception is a valid one in normal times. As long as one’s desire is not uni- 
2. This type of behavior may be even more important in real estate markets than in the stock 
market. Kindleberger cites evidence suggesting that at the height of  the Boston real estate boom, 
nearly two-thirds of  condominiums purchased were intended for resale. 141  Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Crises 
versally shared, it is easier to liquidate a position than it would have been in 
the past. Of  course, when everyone wants to move in the same direction, no 
technological improvement in the organization of the market can increase li- 
quidity. 
The view that bubbles could again emerge in asset markets is supported by 
statistical  evidence  on  speculative prices.  Cutler,  Poterba,  and  Summers 
(1989) document that in the markets for stocks, bonds, foreign exchange, and 
precious metals there is positive serial correlation over periods of weeks and 
months. This implies that there is logic to short-term, positive feedback trad- 
ing, which seeks to catch and ride trends. On one estimate (The Economist 
1989), almost four-fifths of  foreign exchange trading is driven by  technical 
systems that give rise to positive feedback. A different sort of evidence comes 
from the work of Barsky and De Long (1989) who, in studying the American 
stock market, find clear evidence that stock prices rise much more than pro- 
portionately with dividends, as would be predicted by any theory emphasizing 
the market’s eventual overreaction to good news. 
Can anything be done to make the type of prelude to crisis described here 
less likely? There is the problem that bursting a balloon is much easier than 
gradually letting the air out. Seeking to talk the market down will not work if 
the government’s statements are not credible and may work too well  if  its 
statements are too fully credible. Perhaps there is scope for regulation to com- 
bat  the growth of  leverage or the illusion of  general liquidity. Suggestions 
range from increased margin requirements to taxes that would disproportion- 
ately fall on short-term  trader^.^ All such regulatory approaches are probably 
becoming more difficult for any nation to implement unilaterally because of 
the ease with which financial activity can be relocated. 
If financial crisis is less likely today than it once was, the reason is probably 
not  a reduction  in  the  likelihood of  a bubble starting.  I  turn  next  to  the 
bubble’s burst and its consequences for the real economy. 
3.1.2  The Panic Begins 
tinue: 
Here is how the scenario described in the preceding subsection might con- 
In October of  1991, problems began to surface. The widely admired 1990 
leveraged buy out (LBO) of a Fortune 20 company got into serious trouble 
and the price of  the publicly traded ‘stub equity’ fell by  75 percent. One 
major Wall Street firm was forced to merge with another after a poorly su- 
pervised trader lost $500 million by  failing to properly hedge a complex 
position in the newly developed foreign-mortgage-backed securities mar- 
ket. Economic forecasters were confounded by  a drop in the demand for 
3. For a discussion suggesting that transactions taxes would probably not have large effects on 
volatility one way or the other but might increase economic efficiency in other ways, see Summers 
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durable goods as both consumers and businesses were saturated after a dec- 
ade of strong demand. Yet  another hot summer reduced the wheat crop. At 
the same time, the U.S. government had reluctantly concluded that making 
a substantial amount of wheat available to the Soviet Union was necessary 
in order to reduce the risk of Stalinist backlash against Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Investors got jittery even as the  1.3 percent  Consumer Price Index  (CPI) 
increase in September was dismissed as an aberration due largely to agri- 
cultural prices. 
These jitters were compounded when trade frictions between the United 
States and Japan heated up. Recognizing that a large bilateral trade surplus 
would, as a matter of arithmetic, continue for as long as Japanese investors 
invested heavily  in the United States, MOF quietly offered administrative 
guidance  calling  for  reduced  investment  in  American  stocks.  Given 
congressional pressure for new withholding taxes on capital gains received 
by  foreigners, this guidance was effective.  Confronting problems of  both 
unemployment  and  inflation,  American  policy-makers  made  it clear  that 
monetary policy would be used to try to keep the economy growing steadily 
not to support any particular level of the dollar exchange rate. 
Articles urging the proposition that no one had gone broke and many had 
prospered selling out too soon became ubiquitous. The realization that the 
Japanese  had  shifted from being net  buyers  of  stock to being net  sellers 
gradually  spread.  On the  Wednesday  before  Thanksgiving,  the  Dow  fell 
172 points. Experts cautioned that this was a decline of 3 percent, and that 
there had been several dozen previous occasions when the market had fallen 
as much. But the markets in London and Tokyo were off almost 10 percent 
on Thursday and Friday, with American securities declining the most. 
On Monday morning the floodgates opened as a huge number of individ- 
uals and institutions decided that the market had become too risky for them. 
During the day, selling pressure was increased as the intraday margin sys- 
tems instituted after the crash of  1987 forced many traders in both Chicago 
and New York to liquidate their positions. An effort to get firms to prop up 
the market by  buying their own shares failed, as firms complained to the 
authorities that they were so levered already, that they could not part with 
any cash or take on new debt. Institutions learned from the experience of 
the  1987 crash  and  avoided  making  margin payments  to customers  until 
they had received the cash their customers were owed, putting pressure on 
the payments system. Circuit breakers kicked in when the market was down 
200 points and again when it was down 400. But as rumors swept the floor, 
that, off  the floor, large blocks were being sold at large discounts to past 
market prices,  the panic only increased.  By the end of the day, over  1.3 
billion  shares  had  changed hands  as the  Dow  Jones average declined by 
1153 points. 
Again, the  main  elements in  Kindleberger’s model  are  present.  First, at 
some point, an event occurs that raises doubts about the future. Some insiders 143  Macroeconomic Consequences of  Financial Crises 
decide to take their profits and get out. Second, the market hesitates. The pool 
of  new speculators dries up. The possibility of a panic becomes real. Third, 
the prophecy  becomes  self-fulfilling as investors  rush to get out while  they 
still can. As always in troubled times, there is a flight to quality. 
As with the first stage of Kindleberger’s  crisis model, there is little reason 
to believe  that this  second stage has become less likely  over time. Mutatis 
mutandis. The scenario here is very much like the one played out on 19 October 
1987. In the wake of that event, a vast effort has gone into seeking regulatory 
changes that would make market meltdowns less likely or at least less violent. 
It is doubtful that much has been accomplished. The observation that the mar- 
ket had  a 66-hour circuit breaker before the Monday crash raises questions 
about the efficacy of closing the market during a panic. So does the experience 
of Hong Kong, where the market was closed and not permitted to reopen. 
Raising margin requirements may well help stop bubbles from starting but 
it  is unlikely to be helpful in controlling bubbles once they start. Indeed, it 
creates positive feedback by accelerating the selling out of positions of those 
caught by price declines. As Garcia and Plautz (1988) note, this is what hap- 
pened  during the  1980  silver  episode.  Raising  margin  requirements  also 
makes it more difficult for venturesome speculators who want to buy at what 
they regard as low prices. 
Increasing capital requirements for specialists or broker dealers may, as dis- 
cussed below, protect the integrity of the payments system, but it is unlikely 
to do much to stabilize prices in a rapidly falling market. Specialists can create 
liquidity but they cannot stabilize a market where everyone wants to sell. The 
reality is that little has happened to make the second stage of a Kindleberger 
crisis less likely  than  it was historically.  Nor are there plausible regulatory 
actions that would achieve this objective. 
3.1.3 
So far, the scenario that I have constructed represents what Schwartz labels 
a “pseudo crisis.” The disturbance has not yet affected the health of financial 
institutions  or been transmitted  to the  real economy. The important  institu- 
tional and attitudinal changes that have taken place in the last 50 years have 
been  directed  much more at containing  the damage that financial  problems 
might cause than at preventing speculative bubbles from starting. As I argue 
in the next section, which is directed at the appropriate behavior of lenders of 
last resort, this makes a very big difference. In order to illustrate the impor- 
tance of  these changes, I complete my scenario by assuming the authorities 
behave in the way they did in the  1930s. Needless to say, this is not what I 
would anticipate. 
One major brokerage house had been very eager for business. As a conse- 
quence, it treated the investor suitability requirements  for trading futures 
and writing options as a formality.  When the market fell more than  1000 
points, many of its customers could not meet their obligations. Those who 
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could heard the rumors that the firm might fail and decided to delay making 
their payment. Worried about the firm’s continued ability to function, one 
of the major clearing houses did not make its payment but instead held on 
to it as collateral. By the end of the day, it was clear that the brokerage firm 
would not survive. 
Once rumors that a major brokerage house might fail looked right, sus- 
picion fell on the clearing house of which it was a major part and on the 
banks with which the clearing house did business. One major Chicago bank 
was rumored to have lent very heavily to purchasers of stock and options. 
On  Tuesday  morning  a queue formed outside  its door before it opened. 
Seeing the line outside the bank on “Good Morning America,” many other 
people decided they were better off  taking money out of their banks. Many 
foreign holders of American bank assets remembered what had happened 
to the dollar after the crash of  1987 and  worried about the health  of the 
American banking system and did not roll over their CDs. 
With the chairman of the FDIC at his side, the president went on TV and 
announced that the small depositors had nothing to fear, since deposits of 
up to $100,000 were fully insured by the FDIC, which would surely meet 
all its obligations.  The chairman of the Federal Reserve announced that the 
Federal Reserve would not allow liquidity problems to bring down any ma- 
jor bank. The effect was not the intended one. Holders of large CDs, both 
foreign and domestic, as well as those who were owed money by securities 
companies, interpreted  the announcement  as saying that the  government 
would not necessarily meet their obligation if  the institution holding their 
obligation was not solvent. 
As credit contracted, the level of M2 declined by 4  percent in a two-week 
period, even though the stock of base money increased slightly. Forecasters 
called for recession  and for a sharp decline in the rate of inflation.  With 
inflation  expectations  way  down, real  interest  rates  rose  sharply.  Banks 
froze loans to builders until they had a chance to see which way the econ- 
only would head. Businesses held out on new plant and equipment spend- 
ing until they saw how the situation shook out. Firms whose bank had been 
liquidated  had  an especially  difficult time getting credit of any kind, be- 
cause no one knew them. Fearful  that the  political  pressures  caused  by 
recession would generate legislation that would make it more difficult for 
them to lay off  workers, they rapidly downsized their work forces. 
Those who had warned about budget deficits claimed that the wolf was 
here at last. Political leaders extracted the message that increases in budget 
deficits would have disastrous consequences for business confidence. As a 
consequence, the provision allowing the repeal of the Gramm-Rudman tar- 
gets if the economy went into recession was suspended. Spending was cut, 
and even some minor taxes were increased, in an effort to prevent the bud- 
getary situation from deteriorating. 
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rose to 11 percent and real GNP declined by 7 percent.  For the first time 
since the war, there was a decline from year to year in the consumption of 
nondurable goods. 
Could this really happen? For the most part, it depends on how the govern- 
ment carries out its lender-of-last-resort  responsibility,  an issue discussed in 
the next section. Here I comment on two other aspects of the scenario. Both 
address the macroeconomic policy response to a weakening economy. 
As table  3.1 demonstrates,  a major difference between the pre-and  post- 
World War I1 economies is the presence of automatic stabilizers in the postwar 
economy. Before World War  11,  a $1-drop in GNP translated into a $.95 de- 
cline in disposable  income.  Since the war,  less each $1 change in GNP has 
translated into a drop of only $.39  in GNP. This change is largely the result of 
the  expansion of  government’s  role  in  the  economy.  When  the  economy 
slumps, government  tax  collections  decline  and  government  transfer  pay- 
ments increase, both of which cushion the decline in disposable income. The 
mirror image of stability in disposable income is instability in the government 
deficit. Hence, automatic stabilizers cannot work if  the government seeks to 
maintain  a constant budget  deficit in the face of  changing economic condi- 
tions. 
The other fundamentally  important change over the past 50 years regards 
monetary policy. Quite apart from whatever it does or does not do to back up 
financial institutions that get in trouble, the Federal Reserve has the ability to 
alter the money stock through open market operations. In the face of a defla- 
tionary crisis like the one described above, it is hard to see why it would not 
be appropriate to pursue an expansionary monetary policy that would prevent 
the expectation of  deflation from pushing real interest rates way up. The use 
of  such a policy would at least limit the spillover consequences of financial 
Table 3.1  Relation between National Income and Disposable Income 
Effect of $1  Change in 
National Income on  - 







Source; J. Bradford De Long and Lawrence H. Summers. 1986. The changing cyclical variability 
of  economic activity  in  the  United  States.  In  The American business  cycle; Continuity and 
change, ed. Robert J. Gordon, 679-719.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Noret  The table shows regressions of the change in annual disposable income on the change in 
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institution failures.  Whether it would be enough to fully contain the damage 
is the issue of whether a lender of  last resort is necessary, the subject of the 
next section. 
3.2  The Lender-of-Last-Resort  Function 
Most treatments of financial crisis assign a central role to what is or is not 
done by the lender of last resort. In its 1984 submission to the Bush Commis- 
sion on Financial Deregulation,  the Federal Reserve highlighted the primacy 
of its lender-of-last-resort function: 
A  basic continuing  responsibility  of  any central bank-and  the principal 
reason  for the founding of  the Federal  Reserve-is  to assure  stable and 
smoothly functioning  financial and payments systems. These are the pre- 
requisites for, and complementary  to, the central bank’s responsibility for 
conducting  monetary  policy as it is more narrowly conceived.  . . . What 
has not changed, and is not likely to change, is the idea that a central bank 
must, to the extent possible, head off  and deal with financial disturbances 
and crises. 
To  these  ends the Congress has over the  last 70 years,  authorized the 
Federal  Reserve  (a) to  be  a  major  participant  in  the  nation’s  payments 
mechanism, (b)  to lend at the discount window  as the ultimate source of 
liquidity for the economy, and (c)  to regulate and supervise key sectors of 
the financial markets, both domestic and international. These functions are 
in addition to, and largely predate,  the more purely “monetary” functions 
of engaging in open market  and foreign exchange operations and setting 
reserve requirements. 
Accepting  Congress’s  goal  of  maintaining  a  smoothly  functioning  pay- 
ments and financial system, there remains the question of what public actions 
can best achieve this objective.  I  consider here four positions regarding the 
appropriate behavior of the lender of last resort, each of which has received 
substantial support in the history of thought on this subject. 
3.2.1  Free Banking 
The case for free banking, without a public lender of last resort, has under- 
gone  something  of  an  intellectual revival  in recent years.  But  as Goodhart 
(1985) stresses, it goes back to Bagehot (1873) and before. While Bagehot is 
remembered for his views on how a central bank should carry out the lender- 
of-last-resort  function, he actually preferred a system of  free banking.  Thus 
he wrote: 
A large number of banks, each feeling that its credit was at stake in keeping 
a good reserve,  probably would keep one; if  anyone did not, it would be 
criticized constantly,  and would soon lose its standing and in the end dis- 
appear. And  such banks would meet an incipient  panic freely and gener- 
ously. They would  advance out of  their reserve  boldly  and know at such 
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have strength.  Such a system reduces to a minimum the risk that is caused 
by the deposit. If the national money can safely be deposited in banks in 
any way, this is the way to make it safe. (Bagehot 1873, 104) 
There is considerable controversy as to how well free banking worked dur- 
ing the historical periods in which it was tried.  It is a fact, though, that the 
institution has not endured. A number of market failures associated with  a 
free banking  system  may  suggest  the reasons  why.  Each  ultimately  relates 
back to problems of information asymmetry that call banking institutions into 
existence  in the  first place.  The niche of the banker  is his ability to assess 
creditworthiness, an ability borne of general experience and experience with 
particular borrowers.  If a bank’s assets could readily be evaluated by the pub- 
lic, there would be little need for banks as institutions. 
The fact that the value of a bank’s loan portfolio is private information has 
two important implications. First, it means that the bank cannot mark its port- 
folio to market continuously. This means that it must offer depositors fixed 
dollar repayments, creating the possibility of runs. Whenever a bank gets into 
trouble, the depositors who get their money out first do best. The situation is 
very different from that of equity holders in a company, who gain no advan- 
tage from moving quickly when public information suggests that their com- 
pany is in trouble.  Second, it means that bank assets are illiquid. If all bank 
assets could  readily  be  traded  on  a  secondary  market,  the  need  for  banks 
would  be greatly  reduced. Firms could  simply  sell securities to the  public 
without the need for an intermediary. 
As the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggests, these two features 
of banking institutions are likely to lead to instability in the absence of public 
actions. More precisely, prophecies about a bank’s health are likely to be self- 
fulfilling. A bank may be perfectly healthy as long as it is expected to remain 
perfectly  healthy.  But if it is expected to fail, depositors will demand their 
money. If the bank is forced to liquidate its asset portfolio at distress prices, 
because of the difficulty outsiders have in evaluating its components, the bank 
may become insolvent. 
The instability  associated  with  self-fulfilling prophecies  is  magnified  by 
three further considerations.  First, there may be “reputational externalities,” 
where one bank’s failure affects the public perception of the health of other 
banks.4  This might be because of concern about the consequences of the failed 
bank’s default, because of a perception that other banks hold portfolios similar 
to the portfolio of the bank that just failed, or because of  concern about the 
macroeconomic ramifications of bank failures. 
Second, bank failures will have an adverse impact on the firms that depend 
on them. To the extent that established relationships represent a kind of capi- 
tal, beneficially owned by both borrower and creditor, both will suffer losses 
when a bank fails. To  some extent, firms can avoid this problem by forming 
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relationships with a number of  banks, but this obviously imposes costs of its 
own. 
Third, bank failures and failures of the firms that depend on banks may have 
a pronounced  impact  on the  level of  aggregate demand. As banks contract 
credit,  the supply of  money declines. Especially if  the price level does not 
react immediately, the result will be higher real interest rates, which will tend 
to discourage spending as well as increase the pressure on financially fragile 
institutions.  This transmission  mechanism  figures  prominently  in many  ac- 
counts of the onset of the Depression (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1963). 
All of these factors suggest that economists’ traditional presumption in fa- 
vor of free and unregulated markets cannot be reflexively applied to financial 
institutions. This is especially the case when there are already substantial in- 
terventions in the market, through deposit insurance and through the tendency 
of market actors rightly or wrongly to suppose that the government is likely to 
bail out institutions that get into trouble. However, establishing that the mar- 
ket’s functioning  will  be impaired  by  information  problems does not  dem- 
onstrate  that  improvements  are possible,  given  that  governments  also lack 
complete information.  I  turn  next  to the  consideration  of  possible  active 
lender-of-last-resort strategies. 
3.2.2  A Monetarist Lender of Last Resort 
Historical accounts of panics always emphasize the effect of failing finan- 
cial  institutions  on  the  money  supply  and  the  adverse  effects  of  a  falling 
money stock on economic performance. A minimalist view of the function of 
the central bank would hold that, in the face of a major disturbance, it should 
use open market operations to make sure that the money stock, somehow de- 
fined, is not allowed to decline precipitously; a more activist view would seek 
to insure that it rises rapidly enough to offset any decline in velocity associated 
with financial panic.  On this monetarist view, there is no need for the Fed to 
make use of the discount window or moral suasion in the face of  crisis.  It 
suffices to make enough liquidity available. 
Goodfriend  and King (1988) argue that “banking” policy as distinct from 
monetary  policy  is unnecessary.  Providing  emergency  loans  to institutions 
suffering liquidity problems is similar to the line-of-credit service that the pri- 
vate sector already provides.  It is not obvious why the Fed is more efficient 
than the private sector at the monitoring and supervision that is required.  A 
policy of maintaining liquidity but not helping out specific institutions has the 
virtue of avoiding political pressures to bail out insolvent institutions and of 
making it more difficult for institutions that are in trouble to exploit the protec- 
tion provided by deposit insurance in order to take on excessive risks.5 These 
features help ex post, ex ante; they also discourage risk taking. 
5.  This could be done by  pledging a bank’s best collateral to the Fed, and then using the pro- 
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Is this approach sufficient to contain the damage that financial crisis might 
otherwise cause? Relevant experience is scarce, since the modern Federal Re- 
serve has taken a more active role in times of crisis, and crises in earlier times 
usually coincided with sharp declines in the money stock. But the analysis of 
the potential difficulties with a free banking system suggests that support of 
specific institutions,  rather than just the money stock, may be desirable. De- 
clines in the money stock are just one of the potential adverse impacts of bank 
failures.  Bank failures, or the failure of financial institutions more generally 
imposes external costs on firms with whom they do business and through the 
damage they  do to the reputations  of other banks.  Private  lenders have  no 
incentive to take account of these external benefits, and so there is a presump- 
tion that they will lend too little. 
The point here may be put in a different way.  Because of the relationship- 
specific capital each has accumulated, reserves at one bank are an imperfect 
substitute for reserves at another. Maintaining a given aggregate level of lend- 
ing is not sufficient to avoid the losses associated with a financial disturbance. 
There is one reasonably  clear lesson from the crash period.  It would not 
have been sufficient for the Fed to keep the money stock growing steadily. As 
table 3.2 illustrates, their successful action, involved rapid money growth. By 
almost any measure, monetary policy turned highly expansionary during the 
crash period.  Had there been no market break,  it is extremely unlikely  that 
monetary policy would have been so expansionary. In this sense, the Fed did 
more than avoid the transmission of the financial disturbance to the real econ- 
omy through a declining money stock. 
Table 3.2  Federal Reserve Activity and the Crash of 1987 
A. Money Supply 
% Growth Rate (Annualized) 
Monetary Measure  October 1987  Average 1987 
Monetary Base  11.9 
MI  15.2 
M2  7.0 
M3  7.8 






B. Federal Reserve Credit (Billion $US) 
Measure  October 7  October 14  October 21  October 28  November 4 November 11  November 18 
Credit  237.9  239.5  243.5  251.3  236.1  240.4  237.9 
Loans  1.4  .9  3.2  .8  .6  .5  .I 
Float  1.3  2.1  1.1  2.0  .6  .6  1.5 
~~ 
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Journalistic accounts (e.g., Metz  1988) leave the impression that, in addi- 
tion to the provision of liquidity, moral suasion (arm twisting?) was a major 
element of the Fed’s response to the crash as it sought to convince major banks 
to support other financial institutions.  Evaluating its importance for the ulti- 
mate outcome is difficult. However, an alternative elaboration of the scenario 
developed in the previous section makes it plausible that it might have been 
quite important. 
Stung by continuing  criticisms of policies that had led the government to 
incur a $400 billion dollar S&L bailout, policymakers were skittish about 
standing behind ailing institutions of any kind. Following the advice of the 
Shadow Open Market Committee, who issued a report in 1990 urging that 
the Federal Reserve confine its lender-of-last-resort  role to preventing the 
money stock from falling below its ‘normal growth path’ and avoiding any 
sharp run-up in real interest rates, the Fed announced its intention to pro- 
vide liquidity to the system, but made it clear that the choice of what banks 
did with their increased reserves was entirely up to them. 
Bankers considered  the risk-return ratio on short-term  loans to several 
major  firms caught out by  differences  in the  settlement periods between 
different markets. They realized that it did not take much of a risk that their 
loans would  somehow go bad, to offset the opportunity to earn premium 
interest rates over a period of days or weeks. There were limits on the inter- 
est rates banks could charge, since the willingness of a customer to pay a 
high interest rate indicated the depth of its problems. After rumors began to 
circulate  that one major investment house had failed to properly  hedge a 
major underwriting  commitment, the banks pulled in their lines of  credit. 
While the  Federal  funds rate  fell by  350 basis points  overnight,  several 
major securities  firms  had  difficulty  getting credit, and one went under, 
bringing down a major clearing house. 
The markets were closed for a day as the damage was sorted out. When 
an  attempt  was made to reopen  them, it was  impossible  to find buyers. 
Fearing that the markets might close again, locking them in, no major buy- 
ers came forward even as prices fell. The panic continued . . . 
The crucial  point  here  is that  driving down the  federal funds rate is not 
likely  to be sufficient to stop prophecies that predict  the failure of banks or 
securities  firms from proving  to be  self-fulfilling.  A more ambitious  set of 
lender-of-last-resort policies would seem to be necessary. 
3.2.3 
The classical view of proper behavior of  the lender-of-last-resort dates back 
at least to Bagehot (1 873). It may be stated briefly as follows: central banks 
should adopt, announce, and follow a policy of lending freely and aggres- 
sively but at a penalty rate to all sound but no unsound borrowers in time of 
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crisis. Thus Bagehot writes “in wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many 
and the best way  to prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the primary 
failure which causes them” (25). He continues, “If people could be convinced 
that utter ruin is not coming, most likely they would cease to run in such a 
mad way for money” (64). And he recognizes that “the way to cause alarm is 
to refuse someone who has good security to offer” (97). 
Bagehot was well aware of the potential adverse incentive effects of provid- 
ing insurance. This awareness accounted for his admonition that the lender of 
last resort should “never lend to unsound people” (97). He also insisted that 
loans in time of crisis be made at a penalty rate. This was intended to discour- 
age regular reliance on the lender of last resort, to discourage risk taking by 
financial institutions, and to enable the Bank of England to make profits. Ba- 
gehot regarded it as critically important that a lender-of-last-resort  policy be 
preannounced in writing: “Until we have on this point what loans will be made 
in times of crisis, a clear understanding with the Bank of England, both our 
liability for crisis and our terror at crisis will always be greater than they 
would otherwise be” (101). 
Bagehot’s approach is appealing. It offers the promise that panics will be 
controlled, but that excessive risk taking will be penalized. His admonitions 
amount to asserting that the central bank should be wise and should prevent 
panics but not interfere when institutions are on the verge of failing for fun- 
damental reasons. But, they beg the fundamental question of  how  liquidity 
and solvency problems are to be distinguished in the very short time in which 
a lender of last resort must act. If no one doubted an institution’s solvency, it 
is hard to see how it could experience liquidity problems. 
As the scenario developed in the previous subsection suggests, the steps 
that Bagehot recommends the central bank take to avoid encouraging exces- 
sive risk taking also compromise its effectiveness in time of crisis. The repu- 
tation externalities, loss of  relationship-specific capital, and the macroeco- 
nomic fallout of  the  bank  failure do not  depend on whether it  failed for 
liquidity reasons or because it was  fundamentally insolvent. High  interest 
rates on government loans make it more difficult for banks to meet their other 
obligations. And  banks that pay them send signals that they are in  serious 
trouble, signals that will be destabilizing in times of panic. 
3.2.4  The Modem Pragmatic View 
Garcia and Plautz (1988) carefully compare the behavior of  the American 
Federal Reserve with the classic lender-of-last-resort  concept. Four important 
differences stand out. First, current practice is to make loans only to deposi- 
tory institutions and only indirectly to other financial institutions. During the 
crash, the Fed did not make direct loans to clearing houses or to investment 
banks that experienced liquidity problems, but  instead encouraged banks to 
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how hard arms are twisted, the distinction may be immaterial.  But as other 
institutions take on more and more of the attributes of banks, the risk that they 
too will face runs increases. 
Second, the extent of the government  safety net  has  not  been  explicitly 
spelled out. It is clear that deposit insurance extends de facto more widely 
than it extends de jure, but its exact extent has never been made clear. This 
probably reflects concerns about moral hazard. Preserving the possibility that 
the government will not step in encourages depositors to scrutinize financial 
institutions and institutions to reduce their risk taking. This virtue of ambigu- 
ity must be traded off  against the increase in the risk of panic that it creates. It 
is noteworthy that the Fed waited until Tuesday morning, 20 October, to reaf- 
firm its commitment to providing liquidity. 
Third, the Federal Reserve under some circumstances does support institu- 
tions that are insolvent,  as the Cleveland District Bank explicitly recognized 
in its  1985 report. This practice obviously runs the risk made all too real by 
the S&L experience of encouraging excessive risk taking. But it may be nec- 
essary if stability is to be preserved. The definition of solvency in a situation 
where the value of bank assets depends on how rapidly they must be liquidated 
is ambiguous. 
There is  one additional  aspect  of  the  problem, a detailed  discussion  of 
which is beyond the scope of this paper.  Instantly closing insolvent  institu- 
tions may wreak havoc with the payments mechanism. As a Federal Reserve 
memorandum of May 1985, quoted in Humphrey  (1986) notes:  “Total day- 
light overdrafts average $1 10 to $120 billion per day. . . . On any given day 
about 1600 to 1700 institutions are in overdraft.” Humphrey contemplates the 
possible impact of  the failure of a single institution.  He shows what would 
happen if a randomly selected large participant in the CHIPS system failed on 
a random day. In his simulation, the consequence would be that 24 other insti- 
tutions would then be unable to meet their commitments.  This in turn would 
lead to the failure of another 26 institutions. 
Fourth, the Federal Reserve has in the past provided support at below rather 
than  above market  rates. When  it supports nondepository  institutions indi- 
rectly by making funds available to the banking system as it did during the 
crash, it does not charge a penalty rate. Even in the Bank of New York episode 
described by Volcker (1986) when the Fed made a $23 billion loan because of 
a computer problem the bank was experiencing, assistance was extended at a 
rate well below the Federal funds rate. Again, the conflict between the goal of 
discouraging risk taking and resolving the crisis is apparent. 
The modem pragmatic approach has the very substantial virtue of  having 
prevented the financial disruptions of recent years from having had substantial 
consequences for the real economy. It is difficult to gauge the price of this 
success. Almost certainly, the subsidy provided by the presence of a lender of 
last resort has led to some wasteful investments and to excessive risk taking. I 
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of  the cost of bailouts, which represent transfers,  surely greatly overestimate 
the ex ante costs of  inappropriate investments. If  the presence of  an active 
lender of  last resort has avoided even one percentage point in unemployment 
sustained for one year, it has raised U.S.  income by more than $100 billion. It 
would be surprising if any resulting misallocation of investment were to prove 
nearly this large. 
Lender-of-last-resort policy  is probably  an  area where James Tobin’s in- 
sight that “it take a heap of  Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap” is relevant. 
It may well be that the moral hazard associated with lender-of-last-resort  in- 
surance is better controlled by prudential regulation than by scaling the insur- 
ance back. This at least is the modern pragmatic view that has worked so far. 
3.3  How Might Crisis Come? 
The primary adverse side effects associated  with an aggressive lender-of- 
last-resort policy like the one advocated in the previous section involve moral 
hazard. In the presence of  a Federal safety net, depositors will not scrutinize 
the loan portfolios of  financial institutions.  This will encourage excess risk 
taking. The problem is magnified because a few aggressive institutions can 
put pressure on the rest by offering premium interest rates. Safe institutions 
that do not desire to take unfair advantage of  lender-of-last-resort  protection 
then must choose between raising the rates they  offer and accepting  fewer 
deposits. Just as bad money drives out good, there is a tendency for bad finan- 
cial institutions to drive out good ones. 
The question of  how best to manage the moral hazard effects of lender-of- 
last-resort activity is beyond the scope of this paper, Raising bank capital re- 
quirements would  seem to be an obvious approach. In this section  I  ask a 
different question. Are there any circumstances in which excessively aggres- 
sive lender-of-last-resort  behavior could exacerbate rather than mitigate finan- 
cial crisis? Here is a continuation of the scenario developed above that may be 
instructive in considering this question. 
As the market declined sharply and the Federal Reserve promised to pro- 
vide all necessary liquidity to the system, the Federal funds rate dropped 
very  sharply.  Market participants thought  back  to the experience of  the 
crash of  1987. They recalled that between October of  1987 and the end of 
the year, the dollar fell by almost 15 percent against the yen and other major 
currencies. Given that, the financial distress was greater this time around 
than it had been  in  1987, the U.S. external debt and underlying  inflation 
rates were greater than they had been in  1987, and that experience in the 
late 1980s suggested that exchange rate intervention was both less effica- 
cious and less frequently practiced than it had been earlier, speculators con- 
cluded that the dollar was likely to drop further than it had after the October 
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The dollar dropped 4 percent as daily  volume in the foreign  exchange 
market approached $1 trillion. As the dollar fell, technical trading systems, 
which by some estimates drove 80 percent of all trading activity, picked up 
the downward momentum  and sent signals that the dollar was to be sold. 
Recognizing  the  possibility  of  a  dollar collapse,  many  firms  rushed  to 
hedge their holding of dollar assets by purchasing long-term dollar puts. As 
the issuers  of  these  puts moved  to hedge their position,  the dollar  came 
under further selling pressure. 
No one doubted that the U.S. government would meet its obligations on 
Treasury bills. But a rumor started in Tokyo that the FDIC and the Federal 
Reserve Bank were looking at ways of  standing behind Americans but not 
foreigners in troubled American banks. The realization spread that foreign- 
ers accounted  for more  than  half  of  deposits  at several major  American 
banks,  just  as they  had  at  Continental  Illinois.  Many  foreign  investors 
rushed to sell dollar assets. The remainder refused to roll over CDs issued 
by heavily exposed American banks and instead purchased Treasury bills. 
Banks that depended on foreign deposits started experiencing very heavy 
withdrawals. 
The Federal Reserve received conflicting  advice. Some argued that the 
generous  provision  of  liquidity was exacerbating  the crisis.  They  argued 
that by driving down U.S. interest rates and by suggesting that the Fed was 
not concerned about the exchange rate, the policy of generously providing 
liquidity  to financial institutions  was  actually counterproductive.  Capital 
outflows caused by the expectation of a rapidly falling dollar actually were 
exceeding  government  capital  infusions.  Others  claimed  that,  without  a 
clear  lender-of-last-resort  commitment, the payments  system  would  col- 
lapse and, at that point, flight from the dollar would accelerate. 
Both arguments  were correct. With a single instrument-the  provision 
of liquidity-at  its disposal, the Federal Reserve was unable to hit both a 
liquidity and an exchange rate target. American officials frantically sought 
international cooperation to reduce interest rates, so that U.S. rates could 
be redliced without causing a dollar panic. But they were refused. The Ger- 
mans feared that inflationary consequences of the ongoing pre- 1992 invest- 
ment boom. The Japanese were not eager to help out and were especially 
reluctant to reduce interest rates at a time when the ratio of their land value 
to GNP was at an all time high. 
After several weeks of chaos, an emergency monetary summit was con- 
vened. It was agreed that the major nations would fix the dollar exchange 
rate at a new parity  level of 80 yen and  1.3 marks.  U.S. monetary policy 
sought  to maintain  interest  rates  at a level consistent  with  these targets. 
Several large banks, but none of the largest banks, failed. Consumer confi- 
dence reached a record low. Nervous about the future, businesses curtailed 
their investment plans. Inflation increased sharply as import price increases 
fed through the system creating doubts about the Federal Reserve’s ability 155  Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Crises 
to defend the 80 yen exchange rate. The economy sank into a deep reces- 
sion . . . 
The crucial point here  is that the international dimension greatly  compli- 
cates the problem of the lender of last resort. While sufficiently activist lender- 
of-last-resort  policies can always contain a liquidity crisis, there is the risk 
that they will set off  a currency crisis. Kindleberger (1973) suggests that this 
is what occurred during the Austrian Credit Anstalt crisis in 1971. In the face 
of crisis, the authorities need a second instrument so that a measure of stabil- 
ity can be maintained in both the foreign exchange market and the banking 
system. 
There are two related  strands in the argument that a combined liquidity- 
currency crisis could handcuff the monetary authority. First, if foreigners lose 
confidence in U.S.  financial institutions at the same time they lose confidence 
in the dollar, simultaneous crises will occur. Beyond the possibility of a loss 
of confidence, they may simply, at some point, stop being willing to prop up 
a financial  system in which they  have already lost confidence.  Koo (1989) 
makes a persuasive case that Japanese support for the dollar in 1987 was po- 
litically motivated at least in part and cost in real terms as much as the Mar- 
shall Plan. Second, apart from any fears foreigners may have about U.S. in- 
stitutions,  there  is the risk  that  the lower interest  rates that are part of the 
response to a domestic financial crisis will bring on a currency crisis. 
One possible  additional  instrument  for the authorities in time of crisis is 
fiscal policy. But it is hard to see what could be accomplished beyond some 
stabilization  if  aggregate  demand  started  to  decline.  Excessive  deficit  in- 
creases are not likely to reassure foreigners who are fleeing from dollar assets. 
Nor are the higher interest rates that would result likely to reduce pressure on 
financial institutions.  Reducing the deficit in the face of a major downturn is 
hardly the right response to crisis either. Realistically, changes in budget pol- 
icy are not likely to be made or implemented quickly enough to have an im- 
mediate impact in time of crisis. 
Yet  another possibility is direct intervention to prop up asset prices. If  this 
is possible,  it will  serve to increase  confidence in the financial  system and 
reduce the need for reductions in interest rates that would otherwise lead to a 
currency collapse. Journalistic accounts such as Stewart and Hertzberg ( 1987) 
suggest  that  manipulation  of  a minor  but  crucial  futures market played  an 
important role in preventing a further meltdown on Tuesday, 20 October 1987. 
They also assign a prominent role to orchestrated equity repurchases by major 
companies. Hale (1988) argues that the primary thrust of Japanese securities 
regulation in general, and especially in the aftermath of the crash, is raising 
the value of stocks rather than maintaining a “fair” marketplace in the hmeri- 
can mode. 
The difficulty here is that it is very uncertain whether interventions to prop 
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point of  greatest danger was at niidday on Tuesday, 20 October, after the Fed- 
eral Reserve had made it clear that  it would  provide all necessary  liquidity, 
and after a significant market rally. The situation was turned around, but if a 
misstep had been made, or if the MMI contract had not mysteriously rallied 
by  the equivalent of over 300 Dow points within a few minutes, the market 
might have fallen much further. 
The scenario alluded to  a  final  possible  additional  instrument-foreign 
monetary policy. If it can be dedicated to the foreign exchange market, then 
domestic policy  can concentrate on the domestic  objective  of  providing  li- 
quidity.  In  a  sense though, this just pushes  the problem  back one stage. If 
other nations dedicate their monetary policy to achieving a foreign exchange 
target, they lose the ability to conduct monetary policy with a view to domes- 
tic objectives. They may therefore be unable or unwilling to cooperate when 
crisis comes. Perhaps this is an argument for fixing exchange rates or at least 
institutionalizing the principle of  cooperation to insure that they do not move 
too rapidly. 
Notice that the argument in this section strongly supports the conclusion of 
the last one that there is a case for direct lender-of-last-resort policies beyond 
the general provision of  liquidity. Targeted assistance can presumably restore 
confidence in financial institutions  with less of  a reduction  in interest rates 
than would be necessary with general monetary policies. 
3.4  Conclusions 
Could the United States again experience a financial crisis like those that so 
frequently disrupted the real economy before World War II? As with the prob- 
lem of assessing the risk of major war, one is fortunate that there is not enough 
relevant experience to permit an  accurate judgment.  But there  is cause for 
concern. 
Kindleberger’s preconditions  for crisis are as likely to be satisfied today as 
they ever have been in the past. It is probably now easier to lever assets than 
ever before and the combination of  reduced transactions costs and new mar- 
kets in derivative securities make it easier than it has been in the past for the 
illusion of  universal  liquidity  to take  hold. Asset price bubbles  are now  as 
likely as they have ever been. Bubbles eventually burst. The increased speed 
with which  information diffuses  and the increased  use of  quantitative-rule- 
based trading strategies make it likely that they will burst more quickly today 
than they have in the past. 
The suggestion is sometimes made that the 1987 experience may have en- 
couraged more prudent behavior  and so made bubbles  less likely.  There is 
little concrete evidence to support this hope. There have been only minor reg- 
ulatory changes since the crash. While the usage of portfolio  insurance has 
declined since the crash, various dynamic trading strategies, some of  which 
rely on momentum and so give rise to positive feedback, continue to be widely 
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system has probably become more fragile than before as institutions have rec- 
ognized the risks that their normal procedures exposed them to in  times of 
crisis. 
If  financial crisis is less likely now  than it used to be, the reason is the 
firewalls now in place that insulate the real economy from the effects of finan- 
cial disruptions. Most important in this regard is the federal government’s 
acceptance of the responsibility for stabilizing the economy. Automatic stabi- 
lizers that are now in place cushion the response of the economy to changes in 
demand conditions. At the same time, it is now nearly inconceivable that there 
would be no active lender of  last resort in time of  crisis. This makes crisis 
caused by  contagious bank failures much less likely than in the past. It also 
means that whatever happens to financial institutions, the money stock will 
not be allowed to collapse. 
These factors must be balanced against the difficulty of providing liquidity 
in time of crisis when exchange rates are flexible and expectations are extrap- 
olative. Because the risk of  a currency collapse is now  greater than it was 
when exchange rates were fixed and the world’s capital markets are tightly 
interconnected, the monetary authority’s scope to act as a lender of last resort 
has surely been reduced. 
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2. Hyman P. Minsky 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A Clarification 
The background papers refer to Minsky ’s financial instability hypothesis with- 
out filling in the details. I thought that we might as well hear about the hypoth- 
esis from the horse’s mouth, although we all know that an author is not nec- 
essarily an authentic interpreter of a work. 
The financial  instability  hypothesis was advanced  as an  interpretation  of 
Keynes’s General Theory when issues of  interpretation  were deemed impor- 
tant (Minsky 1975, 1982, 1986). The conceit is that Keynes was aware of the 
great contraction and wholesale collapse of the financial and economic system 
of 1929-33  as he was developing the General Theory. In particular, I assumed 
that Fisher’s  debt-deflation  theory of  great depressions (Fisher  1933) was 
known to Keynes. 
The financial instability hypothesis is addressed to this economy rather than 
to an abstract economy. Our economy is taken to be a capital-using capitalist 
economy with  complex,  sophisticated, and  ever-evolving  financial  institu- 
tions and usages. The model focuses on the relations between finance, asset 
values, and investment. It can be characterized  as a Wall Street view of  the 
world: the principal players are profit-seeking bankers and businessmen. 
I will briefly examine how the financial instability hypothesis addresses five 
issues: asset pricing, financial flows, the relation between financial and eco- 
nomic crises, why it has not yet happened, and what it might take for it to 
happen. 159  Macroeconomic Consequences of  Financial Crises 
Asset Pricing 
In chapter 17 of  the General Theory, in the rebuttal to Viner’s incisive re- 
view (Viner 1936; Keynes 1937a) and in the contribution to the Fisher fest- 
schrift (Keynes  1937b), Keynes treated  liquidity  preference  as determining 
the price level of capital and financial assets. 
I take Keynes’s fundamental insight to be that there are two price levels in 
a capitalist economy and that the proximate determinants of these price levels 
are quite different.  One is of current wages and output, which, when com- 
bined with financing conditions, yields the supply conditions for investment 
output.  The other is of capital and financial assets,  which,  when combined 
with financing conditions, yields the demand for investment output. The sup- 
ply prices of investment output can best be viewed as a markup on labor costs, 
whereas the prices of capital and financial assets are capitalizations of future 
expected cash flows, of future gross profits in an uncertain world. 
For a skeletal no-government capitalist economy to be prosperous, the price 
of  a large enough set of capital assets needs to be greater than the price at 
which  similar assets can be produced  by  a large enough  margin  so that  an 
investment large enough to sustain an acceptable level of profits and thus of 
employment and output takes place.* Financial mechanisms enter into deter- 
mining investment by affecting the prices of  capital assets, production costs 
of investment output, and the leverage on internal finance. 
Following  Keynes,  each  asset  yields  expected,  though  uncertain,  cash 
flows through  time, q, has  expected  carrying costs, c, and has  a liquidity 
premium,  I,  which will vary as institutions and circumstances ch~nge.~  The I 
of  a particular asset reflects the ease with which it can be turned into money 
either by  being pledged  for loans or by being sold: this I depends upon the 
structure  and performance  of  markets  and  institutions.  Developments  that 
have an impact on the way markets and institutions function change the I em- 
bodied in an asset. 
Money is the asset that is transferred when financial commitments are ful- 
filled. In this construct money does not yield a cash flow, has minimal carry- 
ing costs, and has  the  maximum  liquidity.  The price per unit  of  money  is 
always 1. Money prices of other assets are such that the utility of the expected 
cash flows net of the carrying costs plus the utility of the liquidity of the asset, 
as conditioned by the ever-evolving financial system, are equal on the margin 
to the utility of the liquidity embodied in money. 
1. Jan  Kregel (1987) traces Keynes’s treatment of money as determining capital asset prices to 
Sraffa’s (1932a, 1932b) discussion of own rates of interest in  his refutation of Hayek’s natural- 
rate-of-interest argument. 
2.  In  a complex  big-government capitalist economy,  investment can  be  supplemented by  a 
government deficit to yield an acceptable level of profits. 
3.  The q’s that capital assets, as collected in firms, yield are gross profits. The q’s  that financial 
instruments yield are stated in the contracts. What are c-carrying costs to debtors are q-expected 
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An increase in the quantity of money lowers, on the margin, the utility of a 
dollar. In order to lower on the margin the utility of a dollar invested in assets 
whose value is derived mainly from the expected q’s, the dollar price of such 
q-yielding assets needs to rise. As assets possess different mixes of q, c, and 
I, a change in the quantity of money will change the relative prices of assets 
and the price levels of assets and investment output: both the amount and the 
composition of  investment will be affected. In this construct money is never a 
mere veil, it is never neutral. 
For the purposes of  the financial instability hypothesis, the c’s, the carrying 
costs, incorporate  the cash costs imposed  by  the liabilities that are used to 
finance positions in capital and financial assets. As the liabilities of a unit are 
financial assets of other units, the prices of the c-yielding instruments that are 
used  to finance positions  are determined  by  the  same expected cash flows, 
carrying costs, and liquidity concerns that determine the values of q-yielding 
instruments.  A rise in the subjective valuation of liquidity, a fall in the ex- 
pected profit flows, or a rise in the carrying costs of capital and financial assets 
will lower the prices of capital and financial assets. 
Financial Flows 
Liabilities are commitments to pay money at some date, on demand, or if 
specified contingencies  occur. These payment commitments are for both the 
repayment of principal and income. Cash to meet these payment commitments 
is obtained either as: (1) income  due to contributions  to production  (gross 
profits, or profits, wages, and taxes when the model is opened), (2)  the fulfill- 
ment by some other agent of contractual commitments; (3) the result of bor- 
rowing or selling assets, or, trivially, (4) initial cash on hand. 
Liabilities in a balance sheet can be read as generating a time series of cash 
payments,  and assets can be read as generating a time series of expected re- 
ceipts. I classified the structure of these time series as hedge, speculative, and 
Ponzi finan~e.~ 
A unit is hedge financing if the expected cash flows from operations or from 
contract fulfillment over the relevant horizon always exceed, with some mar- 
gin of safety, the expected contractual, demand, and contingent payments.  A 
firm whose liability structure is heavily weighted by equities is almost always 
hedge financing. Only if a large shortfall of  income below expected income 
occurs will a hedge unit have difficulty meeting its payment commitments. 
A unit is engaged in speculative finance when its expected cash receipts on 
income account  and contract  fulfillments exceed the income (interest) pay- 
ments, but it is not able to pay all of the principal due on its debts. A specu- 
4. I  have been criticized for this terminology, especially for the  use of  the  label “Ponzi” for a 
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lative unit needs to roll over some of its debts, to issue new debts in order to 
repay maturing  debts. Speculative  financing units have a position  that they 
have to refinance periodically. A bank has to continually refinance its position. 
A Ponzi financing unit does not earn enough on its income account to fulfill 
its income account payments and so issues debts to meet these payments: its 
deficit is capitalized.  A Ponzi financing unit debits its equity account even as 
it  increases  its indebtedness.  As recent experience  with S&L’s has  shown, 
sharp increases in financing charges can transform speculative units into Ponzi 
units. The present budget position of the United States can be interpreted  as 
an example of Ponzi financing. 
Ponzi financing can be accepted as long as it is believed that the situation is 
transitory and that projected incomes will make the present value of the entire 
stream of earnings positive.  Ponzi units are vulnerable to changes in what is 
believed about future income prospects and to increases in the cost of funds. 
Financial and Economic Crises 
This meeting is a roundtable on reducing the risks of economic crisis. The 
three background  papers are on financial, not economic, crisis; furthermore, 
the papers are not clear on how financial and economic crises are related. The 
financial instability hypothesis is designed to throw light on the relation be- 
tween financial and economic crises. 
The financial instability hypothesis relates finance and aggregate demand 
through the impact of financial market events upon investment and the impact 
of investment upon income and on the flows that are capitalized into the price 
level of capital and financial assets and that are used to fulfill payment com- 
mitment~.~  One way financial market events affect investment is by affecting 
the subjective valuation placed upon I. A rise in the subjective value of I leads 
to a decline in the money price of capital and financial assets, which are val- 
ued mainly for their q’s, the money income they yield. A fall in these prices 
lowers the difference between the prices of capital assets and the supply prices 
of investment output. This will tend to lower investment. Furthermore, a fall 
in the price of financial assets means that investing units will have to pledge 
larger future payments in order to obtain a given amount of investment financ- 
ing. Such a change in the terms of financing tends to constrain investment. 
There are two sources of liquidity: (1) the cash flows from operations or the 
fulfillment of contracts and (2) the cash flows that can be generated by selling 
or pledging  assets-those  assets which it is believed can be readily  sold or 
pledged to raise cash in case the need arises carry lower interest rates. 
5. In  the version I prefer, investment leads to an aggregate of  profits and the competition of 
firms for profits leads to output, employment, and the wage bill. Alternatively output and wage 
and profit incomes can be considered as the result of a multiplier process upon investment and 
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When the successful performance of the economy increases the subjective 
assuredness of the cash flows from operations, the felt need by businessmen 
and bankers for liquidity through asset holdings decreases. A lower valuation 
of liquidity in assets leads to a rise in the price of assets that are valued for the 
q’s they yield. Similarly, if the felt “unsuredness” of the flow of q’s increases, 
bankers and businessmen  will move to  increase the assets they hold that are 
valued for the I they yield. 
A  special proposition  of  the financial  instability  hypothesis is that over a 
protracted period of good times,  when the aggregate of the cash flows from 
operations  (aggregate  profits)  continuously  increases,  the value of portfolio 
liquidity declines.  Both borrowers  and lenders feel that they can safely de- 
crease their holdings of assets that are valued for their liquidity through mar- 
ketability. In particular, if hedge financing dominates then, as good times roll 
along, financing costs become such that profit-seeking  units that were hedge 
financing will  introduce  speculative or rollover financing  into their liability 
structures. The mix of  hedge and speculative financing shifts over protracted 
periods of good times so that the weight of hedge financing decreases and the 
weight of speculative financing increases.  Income shortfalls and interest rate 
increases transform speculative financing units into Ponzi financing units. In 
addition,  the “euphoria”  induced by protracted good times leads to de nova 
Ponzi financing arrangements that can be validated only if rather optimistic 
prices can be obtained for assets. As a result the vulnerability of the financial 
structure to rising interest rates and to shortfalls in gross profits increases with 
protracted good times.6 
A concept worth introducing is the making of position by  selling out posi- 
tion.  When  a unit has payment  commitments  and has been  stripped of the 
assets that can readily be sold or pledged to acquire cash, a shortfall of income 
from operations or a rise in market interest rates can lead to an attempt to make 
position by selling or pledging assets that are not usually sold or pledged. The 
making of position by selling position may be feasible as an isolated incident, 
but any generalized attempt to make position by selling out position leads to a 
collapse of asset values. A financial crisis occurs when there is a generalized 
need  to make position by  selling out position,  which  results in a wide and 
large fall in asset values. As a result, the solvency, on a mark-to-market val- 
uation, of a wide array of financial institutions is compromised.  This leads to 
a spread of refinancing problems. 
A financial crisis leads into an economic crisis when investment declines so 
that a decline in profits as well as output, employment, and wages takes place. 
The decline in profits leads to both a further fall in asset values (the numera- 
tors in the capitalization  relation fall) and a further decline in the ability of 
6. In  early versions  I  had a “nice” accelerator-multiplier  process always working. When the 
financial structure was robust the normal cyclical pattern took place. As the time without a deep 
and long depression increased, the financial system evolved and became fragile so that a normal 
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units to meet their financial commitments. In such an environment a sharp fall 
in commitments for the financing of investment takes place. Further declines 
in employment, output, wage incomes, and profits follow. 
With a lag, unemployment and idle capacity lead to a fall in wages and the 
prices  of  investment  output.  But  in  a  world  where  debts  denominated  in 
money are large, declines in wages and prices may make things worse, not 
better (Caskey and Fazzari 1987). 
Why “It” Hasn’t Happened Yet 
Apt intervention can abort the process I have sketched at two points. One is 
that units can be refinanced, so they have no need to try to make position by 
selling out position. This prevents a sharp and generalized fall in asset prices. 
The spread of mark-to-market insolvency to units that are not in an immediate 
need for refinancing will not take place. Refinancing banks and key financial 
market players that are having trouble making position  is the basic central 
bank lender-of-last-resort operation. Presumably such refinancing takes place 
when dire systemwide repercussions are believed to be imminent if refinanc- 
ing is not undertaken. 
In various embryonic financial crises since the 1960s the Federal Reserve, 
specialized agencies such as FDIC and FSLIC, and the U.S. Treasury have re- 
financed units that otherwise would have had to make position by selling po- 
sition. Furthermore, in the incipient crises the Federal Reserve has furnished 
reserves on a generous scale to markets. (Giordano 1987). Because of these 
measures no generalized or long-lasting interactive process that led to a wide 
and deep decline of asset prices has taken place during the postwar period. 
The second intervention point is profit flows, the aggregate of the q’s that 
come from the income generating and production system. The model for ag- 
gregate profits that I use is derived from Kalecki. In the simple heroically 
abstract version, aggregate profits equal investment; in a version that is a bit 
less heroic, aggregate profits equal investment plus the government deficit. 
The federal government was some 3% of GNP in 1929. The federal govern- 
ment is say 25% of GNP now. The 1929 government was not large enough to 
run a deficit that would offset the impact that the massive decline of invest- 
ment between  1929 and  1933 had upon aggregate profits.’ Today’s govern- 
ment is large enough that the automatic and policy response increases in defi- 
cits that occur when income decreases sustain aggregate profits. 
The combination of lender-of-last-resort interventions, which abort the de- 
velopment of debt-deflation processes, the generalized increase in liquidity as 
the Federal  Reserve reacts to an embryonic crisis, and the deficits that big 
government runs when  income turns down explains why  a serious,  long- 
7. It is worth noting that, because of  the fall in nominal GNP, the relative size of  government 
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lasting and deep depression has not taken place up until now. Big government 
and a central bank that is willing and able to intervene explain why it has not 
happened yet. 
What It Might Take for It to Happen 
The United States had a great deal of what we can call “fiscal autonomy” 
over almost all of the postwar period: there was no need for American policy- 
makers to be much concerned about adverse foreign reactions to the steps that 
were taken to contain and reverse episodes of  embryonic financial instability 
and to the deficits that sustained domestic profits. 
The situation may well be different now. The United States no longer is as 
autonomous or as powerful as in the past.  Scenarios in which cooperation in 
maintaining global asset values and profit flows is necessary but not forthcom- 
ing can be sketched. 
It is only necessary to examine an elaboration of the income accounts ?I  la 
Kalecki to understand  what  is at issue. A rather full statement of the profit 
equation is: profits equal investment  plus the government deficit  minus  the 
deficit  in international  trade plus consumption financed by  incomes derived 
from profits minus savings out of wage incomes. 
The U.S. deficit on trade account is a drain on domestic profits.  Further- 
more, the accumulated deficits have led to large foreign holdings of U.S. fi- 
nancial  assets.  The large U.S.  government deficit  in  relatively  prosperous 
times means that the deficit that is needed to sustain profits in the aftermath of 
even an aborted financial crisis may  well be enormous. In the environment 
that now exists, the interventions needed to sustain the economy the next time 
may well be beyond the combined efforts of the Federal Reserve and the Trea- 
sury. 
Countries with large positions in offshore assets possess fiscal autonomy. If 
global  profits  are to be sustained such countries  need to maintain  domestic 
profits even as they run an international trade deficit. This typically requires 
these countries to be high consumption economies. 
Furthermore, these countries need to take a leading position  in whatever 
lender-of-last-resort  interventions  are needed.  It  may  well  be  that  the next 
time national  responses will  not do, and the apt international  response  may 
require a profound restructuring of  the high-saving export-based economies: 
containing future economic and  financial crises may depend more on  what 
Japan and Europe do than upon the Federal Reserve and the U.S.  Treasury. 
Addenda 
Point I. The emphasis is upon the behavior  of businessmen who manage 
the firms that “own” the capital assets of the economy and the banking com- 
munity that arranges for the liability structure of  these firms. Households are 165  Macroeconomic Consequences of  Financial Crises 
in the background although savings out of wages and consumption financed 
by  profit incomes are household  behaviors. The view can be expressed by 
paraphrasing Orwell, “All agents are equal but some agents are more equal 
than others.” 
Point 2. The economy is envisaged as a nonlinear time-dependent system 
so that endogenous processes can generate “incoherent” states. Cycles and the 
crises are not the result of shocks to the system or of policy errors, they are 
endogenous. 
Point 3.  As Peter Albin put it, “Agents in the model have a model of the 
model; a model of the economy.” The agents the financial instability hypothe- 
sis emphasizes are profit-seeking businessmen and bankers. The model of the 
economy they have includes the possibility  of  financial crisis and economic 
depressions. However, agents recognize that the institutional structure and the 
structure of possible interventions change, so that the past  is an imperfect 
guide to the present and the future. We  can assume that each agent has  a 
contingency plan of how to react to an incipient financial crisis but is not sure 
as to when the contingency plan should be put in motion. 
Point 4.  Success in aborting incipient financial crises and in containing eco- 
nomic declines decreases the value of  I  in the subsequent expansion. If  an 
incipient crisis is successfully aborted, then, after a pause, portfolio adjust- 
ments that reflect a greater assurance that crises will be contained take place. 
Point 5.  The I of our formulation is a characteristic of both assets and lia- 
bility structures. Any change in the view of the future that lowers the value 
placed upon I also increases the willingness of units to lever their position, to 
increase their payment commitments relative to their expected cash flows, and 
the willingness of bankers to finance such levered positions. 
Point 6. The financial instability  hypothesis  is pessimistic. Capitalism  is 
flawed in  that thrusts to financial and economic crises are endogenous phe- 
nomena. An institutional structure and a pattern of intervention may attenuate 
the thrust to malfunctioning, but each success in containment leads to a fur- 
ther elaboration of the financial and economic relations that make the system 
prone to crisis. Success is a transitory phenomenon, although as the era since 
1946 has shown the time in transit can be quite long. 
Point 7.  Big government is necessary to contain depressions because only 
the deficits of  big government can prevent  a collapse of  aggregate  profits. 
Policy needs to be directed to constructing apt government: government that 
is  resource  creating  and  that  provides  real  income outside of  the  fee-for- 
service markets. We all hope that we are entering a post-cold-war world. In 
this world the problem of political economy is to create an effective govern- 
ment tax-and-spending structure that can do the job of stabilizing profits. Un- 
fortunately, successful capitalism requires government to be “big” and this, in 
turn, implies a need for taxes to be high. 
Point 8. The recent  refinancing  of  the FSLIC  shows that  lender-of-last- 
resort intervention ultimately depends upon the faith and credit of the govern- 166  Hyman P.  Minsky 
ment. This faith and credit is worth something in the market only as govern- 
ment tax and spending programs lead to net cash flows in favor of government 
when the economy is functioning well. The government cannot be in a struc- 
tural “Ponzi financing” posture: the in-place tax and spending programs need 
to show a surplus, not necessarily now but when things are going well. Thus, 
while the deficits that big government can run are necessary to sustain aggre- 
gate profits,  and therefore  to contain  thrusts to depressions,  the viability  of 
lender-of-last-resort  interventions  depends upon government debt being ac- 
ceptable in national and international portfolios. Such acceptability ultimately 
depends upon the government’s ability to force a net cash flow in its favor, 
that is, to run a surplus. Deficits therefore must be transitory and a response 
to well-defined conditions. 
Point 9. There is nothing in principle nor in the facts of  an economy with 
debts that says that the United States cannot become an Argentina-a  country 
whose debts, whether denominated  in its own or in foreign currency, are not 
marketable. 
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3. Paul A. Samuelson 
A Personal View on Crises and Economic Cycles 
Economic science is prone to cycles of theoretical fads. Before 1929, pundits 
believed that prosperity in agriculture was necessary if the economy was to be 
prosperous.  “Food  will  win  the War  and write  the  Peace.” That was  First 
World War  boilerplate,  still being  muttered by Jeremiahs of the  mid-1920s 
who warned that hard times on the farms would bring on a world debacle. 
After  1929 the saying that Wall  Street crashes cause Main Street slumps 
became dogma. As recently  as 1962, when  President Kennedy lost his pa- 
tience with Roger Blough of U.S. Steel, the resulting crack in the Dow Jones 
indexes was feared to entail a National  Bureau recession  for the  American 
economy. At least that is what you would have learned if, trapped in any Sher- 
aton Hotel and having exhausted the Moody Bible, you read the autobiogra- 
phy planted there by Ernest Henderson, the founder of the Sheraton hostelry 
chain and a self-taught expert in macroeconomics.  Henderson,  exaggerating 
my Rasputin powers over J. F.  Kennedy, called me in to say: “Tell your man 
that in six months time we’ll be in a real bad recession unless he backs down 
from his business bashing.” I solemnly recorded in my little black COOP book 
that a recession  would arrive  by  November  1962. But  such are my powers 
over the head of state that by that date the GNP was in a nice recovery from 
its mini-growth-recession  of earlier  1962. The post-Blough  hiccough in the 
production  index,  by  the way,  was  about  what  Franco  Modigliani’s  MIT- 
Penn-Fed model predicted ought to result from the realized loss in consumer 
wealth and from the increase in the cost in investment funds implied by the 
drop in price/earnings ratios of common stocks. 
Flushed with this imposing sample of victory,  I had to wonder when Stan 
Fischer and Bob Merton scolded us economists for not taking the stock market 
more seriously as a macroeconomic phenomenon.  Lay people take it too seri- 
ously. But economists, Fischer and Merton complained, do not take it seri- 
ously  enough.  Nonetheless,  Modigliani  and  I  discounted  after  19 October 
1987 the dire predictions that a worldwide recession was in the cards. (So did 
all of  the 50 consensus forecasters followed by Blue Chip Indicators.) True, 
the drop in share wealth in October 1987 was fully the equal of  the drop in 
share wealth in October 1929; and, internationally,  the crisis and price attri- 
tion was in 1987 even more uniform than in 1929. True also, after 1929 came 
the worldwide depression that was not to be exorcised completely until World 
War  I1 itself. However, although Franco and Jim Tobin and Bob Solow and I 
knew that Model-T Keynesianism  had to add wealth magnitudes to its flow 
determinants, we also knew that it was only vulgar journalists  who believed 
that the 25 percent rates of unemployment in 1933  United States and Germany 
were Granger-caused  by the exits of capitalists from the unleaning towers of 
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As hundreds of banks failed, runs on 15,000 banks caused many thousands 
more of them to fail. The velocity  of  high-powered money rationally  nose- 
dived as people chose to hold more currency and less deposits; the result was 
that,  despite  the  contrived  increase  in  the  total  of  high-powered  money 
throughout the early 1930s, the total nominal GNP shrank by half from 1929 
to 1933. Monetarists, wise in their later time, indicted the Fed authorities for 
not  creating  whatever  high-powered  money  it  would  have  taken  to  keep 
money  x  velocity ahead of the eroding price level.  Although no one could 
have beaten such a tautological rap, I concur in the view that departing mili- 
tantly from orthodox finance in 193  1 could have reduced greatly the historical 
decline  in  high-powered  velocity  and  thereby  saved much human  suffering 
and economic waste. 
Then, If Not Now? 
Was there ever a cogent case for the thesis that panics and crises play a key 
role in economic slumps of real output and employment? 
If you read the early literature on good times and bad times, you will get 
the impression that panics and crises were more important in the mechanism 
of business cycles back in the nineteenth century than they are now or have 
been since, say, 1913. I doubt that this is a safe guide to reality. Much of the 
alleged change in the role of panics must surely be an artifact of economists’ 
previous lack of  statistical knowledge about true economic history. 
John Hicks in his last book exemplifies the fallacy. In A Market Theory of 
Money (Oxford University  Press,  1989), Hicks writes:  “Nineteenth-century 
cycles (were) not statistical cycles but a succession of crises’’ (vii). “I want to 
insist that this [concept of a statistical cycle] is not what Jevons and his con- 
temporaries can have had in mind.  . . . They were thinking of  the sequence 
of  trade  crises which  had  marked  the  preceding  half-century,  occurring  in 
1825, 1837 (especially in America), 1847, 1857, and 1867” (94). 
The weight of the evidence to me points otherwise.  If a Christina Romer 
were able to go back and construct a representative index for the nineteenth 
century of real production, employment, price levels, investment, and profits, 
Lombard  Street  would  perhaps  be  no  more  important  in  understanding 
Mitchell-type  business  cycles than  Wall  Street  was  in  the  1920s or in  the 
1945-89  period. 
Schumpeter hailed Clement Juglar as a great business-cycle pioneer-and 
named the intermediate business cycle after him-because  he was allegedly 
the first to move from the crisis paradigm to the Mitchell-Hansen paradigm. 
Adam Smith prattled about the division of  labor in The Wealth of Nations 
without  showing  in his text  any appreciation  that the Industrial Revolution 
was bursting out around him. Nor could he have learned better from his excel- 
lent library. 
So it was with Henry Thornton and John Stuart Mill. Their chronicles lack 
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effects on Main Street in the last few decades of the twentieth century, was it 
truly different in 1929 and 1889 and 1839 and 1789? 
I must be careful not to overstate my doubts. It may well have been the case 
that in earlier times the ratio of the value of stocks and bonds listed on bourses 
was less in relation to national wealth and GNP than in the post-World  War I1 
epoch.  The  Modigliani-Tobin  partial  derivatives,  (consumption)/(wealth), 
may also have been smaller then rather than larger. And the effects of Lom- 
bard  Street on the changes in  the cost and availability  of funds to finance 
investment may also have been limited the more we go back in history. 
Nonetheless, I do not wish to deny-nay  I want positively to emphasize- 
the fact that before  1930 we were in pure capitalism, whereas in 1987 we are 
a case of the mixed economy.  The ability of a crisis/panic in Wall Street or 
Lombard Street to tip off  a cascade of  failures of unregulated banks was as- 
suredly greater in history than it is or has been since 1933. The money supply 
itself in the old days tended to be a casualty of the crisis in a way that is no 
longer true. This is major. 
Another way of putting things is this. In Gladstone’s time, as in the time of 
Herbert Hoover, there was an effective political presumption toward long-run 
stability of the price level. Although Britain since 1688 never lived up to its 
presumption  of balanced  fiscal budgets,  never  was there acceptance  by  the 
official elite that the gold standard could be ignored as a constraint and that 
deliberate deficit spending was an admissible and admirable tool of policy. 
Why was the prophet Hyman Minsky for so many decades a voice crying 
out in the wilderness? “A qualitative credit crisis is in the intermediate-term 
cards. Wolf! Wolf!” 
The answer for his long wait has to be found in the laws of  behavior  of 
populist democracy in the “Age after Keynes.” Every three years when I came 
to revise my textbook, two main charts would jump off the page to command 
my attention.  One was the trendless behavior of real wages from about 1250 
to 1750, followed by a sea change to a rising trend of the real wage rate in the 
“Age after Newton.”  The other was the trendless behavior of staple prices in 
Europe and North America, as postwar deflations undid the peaks of wartime 
inflation-followed,  since 1932 and the “new deals” in America and Europe, 
by a remorseless upward trend in the cost-of-living index. 
On  every  proper  Richter scale, the  1987 crash  rivaled  that of  the  1929 
crash. By  contrast  with journalists, mainstream economists  correctly  com- 
puted  that  the  late-1987  25 percent  erosion  of  worldwide  asset  values  was 
prone to reduce by about  1 percent per annum the likely  1987-89  growth in 
global output. Had you told those economists to factor into their IS-LM dia- 
grams the worldwide acceleration of the money supply induced by the Octo- 
ber  1987 crash, their regressions would have projected the continuance of the 
1982 recovery that history has recorded in 1988-89. 
I should not need to say it, but I will say it: Reacting and overreacting to 
each and every market crisis by macro policy can alter the historic pattern of 
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to give us a pattern of economic history  that is aptly described by  the Good 
Fairy who says, “And they lived happily ever afterward, with minimal unem- 
ployment, price stability,  and growth in output characterized by almost-unit 
roots.”  There will return times when markets crash against a background of 
stagflation. Then engineering more money to prevent drops in real output will 
add to policy dilemmas connected with increases in prices. 
4. William  Poole 
Macroeconomic Effects of  Financial Crises 
The problem with the title of this session is that so little is known about the 
subject. It may be that no government response is required to a market crash 
other than to maintain  money growth and continue with  whatever  were the 
optimal policies before the crash. But I know of no one who wants to conduct 
such an experiment. The issue, then, is what the government’s response ought 
to be to minimize fallout from a crash without causing harmful side effects. 
Let me start by noting that studying financial crisis is more important than 
most people recognize because the government is not nearly as well-prepared 
as it should be. I can illustrate one reason for this situation by  adding a few 
sentences to the scenario spun out by Larry Summers. 
Heavy  selling pressure  hit the market at the opening bell.  Investors were 
jolted by  an article in the  Washington Post  reporting  that  the Council of 
Economic  Advisers (CEA) was  well  along in a secret study  of what the 
government  should do if  a certain large money-center bank  were to fail. 
The Post article was based on a background interview with a high Treasury 
official. Most Washington experts believed that the interview was with the 
Treasury  secretary himself, who was known to be feuding with the CEA 
chairman. The president was reported to be furious given his press confer- 
ence last week where he said that everyone in the administration had com- 
plete confidence in the banking system. 
The situation may be better abroad, but in the United States, government- 
by-leak makes  it  extremely  difficult for senior officials to engage in contin- 
gency planning. We should not be surprised when the U.S. government reacts 
to financial crises in a confused manner or in ways that set damaging prece- 
dents. We can agree that a good part of the problem is that the economists do 
not understand crashes, but having said that, it is important to emphasize what 
we do know. There are policies that can reduce the damage to the real econ- 
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The most significant single fact is that companies and individuals with no 
debt rarely  go bankrupt. There was no debt-deflation  process  in the  severe 
recession of 1920-21 because there was so little debt after World War I. At an 
absolute minimum the government should not provide positive tax incentives 
as at present for firms and individuals to accumulate debt. For individuals, we 
should end the tax deductibility  of  all interest, and for firms we should put 
interest and dividends on an identical basis. These are old proposals, but we 
should not leave them out of this discussion simply because they are old and 
obvious. 
Besides the tax law, the other fundamental condition that needs reform is 
deposit insurance. Deposit insurance worked in the 1980s; the economy has 
been little troubled by runs on insured banks and thrifts.  The taxpayer cost, 
though, has been high. If deposit insurance is not reformed to provide better 
private incentives we will inevitably see extension of regulation in an effort to 
keep taxpayer costs down. Regulation will also be costly, but the costs will be 
hidden in the form of market inefficiencies. More important, however,  I do 
not see how regulatory approaches can be easily effective in a highly compet- 
itive world financial market. There is also a danger that the budgetary damage 
inflicted by  deposit insurance will lead  to efforts that will  compromise the 
contribution to stability of deposit insurance. It is for this reason that I do not 
favor proposals to scale back deposit insurance  but instead favor extending 
coverage with reforms to assure that institutions with insured deposits face the 
correct incentives to control risk. 
Even if Congress were to act today to reform the tax law and deposit insur- 
ance, there will necessarily  be a long transitional period before reforms be- 
come fully effective.  In  the meantime,  and  probably  permanently  anyway, 
there will be times when the government must be prepared to act, to deal with 
or head off, financial crises. What should the principles of crisis management 
be? An important concern should be that crisis responses not set bad prece- 
dents. 
First of all, we need to decide which markets deserve special emphasis. 1 
believe  that  we should concentrate on the  stock  markets, investment-grade 
bond markets, and money markets.  Commercial banks,  of  course, play the 
key  role in the money markets and so stability of  the banking  system is of 
central concern. If  we can avoid crashes (including banking panics) in these 
markets, or insulate the real economy from the effects of  the crashes that do 
occur, then we will have solved the problem. I deliberately leave the foreign 
exchange market out of this list for reasons I will discuss in a moment. 
With regard to crashes themselves, I see no reason why we should not make 
use of  the public finance principle that we tax activities we want to discourage 
and subsidize activities we want to encourage. I am sympathetic with the idea 
behind the Tobin tax, but skeptical that this particular proposal is satisfactory. 
Perhaps a better approach would be to design a tax preference for securities 
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than some trigger amount.’ The argument against a tax incentive of this kind 
is that economic efficiency calls for prices to adjust rapidly to new informa- 
tion, but I find it hard to believe that much can be lost if the adjustment can be 
spread over several weeks rather than over a day or a few hours. As with more 
fundamental reforms to strengthen deposit insurance and to discourage debt, 
there  is an  important advantage  to building  more  stability into the  system 
rather than relying on skilled official responses to crisis situations. Building in 
more financial stability would extend the gains from automatic income stabi- 
lization,  which Larry Summers rightly  emphasizes as being of  considerable 
importance. 
Even if we do build more stability into the system we need to be prepared 
to deal with crisis situations.  I agree with Larry’s emphasis on what he calls 
“the modem pragmatic approach,” but believe there is more structure in this 
approach than is apparent on the surface. There is, first, a commitment that 
the government, and especially  the central bank, will do something to deal 
with  a market  crisis rather than let things progress “naturally.” Second,  the 
government’s response  will  be as narrowly  targeted  as possible.  There are 
several reasons for a targeted approach. One is that calming the markets often 
requires that the perceived source of the problem be directly addressed. An- 
other reason is that a narrowly targeted approach has minimal effects in estab- 
lishing precedents. There is not precedent from a special response to a highly 
unusual  situation.  Finally,  what  is often needed  is a response to buy time. 
There are many  problems  that cannot be worked out over night but can be 
worked out over months or years. The difficulty when buying  time is to use 
the time constructively to address the underlying problem, not to run from it. 
Unfortunately,  given the way our political process works it is sometimes nec- 
essary to let things boil a bit before obtaining constructive action. I will dis- 
cuss this point further in a moment. 
I can illustrate these ideas with relatively  minor  market crises, or market 
“upsets” for those who prefer to use “crisis” for something really big. In June 
1970 the commercial paper market had real problems when Penn Central de- 
1. For the stock market a tax  incentive might consist of  a capital gains tax  break on stock 
purchased on a day when Standard and Poor’s 500 Index declines by a large amount. For example, 
when the index declines 3 percent the fraction of capital gains excluded might be zero and the 
fraction excluded might be  100 percent when the index declines 7 percent or more. The exclusion 
could  rise linearly for index decline between 3 and 7 percent to prevent a situation in  which 
investors would hold back from buying in the expectation that the index would fall by  a trigger 
amount. A similar incentive could apply to the 30-year government bond. It is important that an 
incentive be continuous rather than discrete; current “circuit breakers” that involve trading halts 
when prices are down by  trigger amounts may accelerate declines as investors accelerate sales 
and/or delay purchases in the expectation that the market will decline by the trigger amount. Much 
current discussion seems to assume that tax incentives, if  any, should apply to long holding peri- 
ods. Clearly, though, it is socially productive for speculators to engage in short-run trading that 
stabilizes markets, and the tax law should recognize that short-run trading as well as long-run 
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faulted on its commercial paper. The Fed responded by  suspending interest 
rate ceilings on large negotiable CDs and by assuring commercial banks that 
they would have access to the discount window to obtain funds to lend to 
creditworthy borrowers who were cut off  from the commercial paper market. 
The Fed made it clear that the banks would bear the credit risk. The Fed’s 
response to this situation was narrowly targeted; no precedents were set, no 
one was bailed out except in the sense that some borrowers in the commercial 
paper market  were  saved from financial embarrassment, and  there was  no 
change in the Fed’s overall monetary policy stance. Nor was there a market 
perception that the Fed would change its monetary policy. This latter point 
was very important at the time. The Fed was trying to reduce inflation, and 
the situation was touchy with capital flowing from the United States and the 
Bretton Woods system crumbling. 
An earlier Fed crisis response worked much less well. In the credit crunch 
of  1966 the Fed supported emergency one-year legislation extending Regula- 
tion Q interest rate ceilings to thrift institutions. That step bought time, but 
the time was not well used. Extension of  Regulation Q also set a bad prece- 
dent.  It is always hard to know how  things would have gone if  a different 
action had been taken, but it seems to me that it would have been better if the 
Fed had stalled on extension of Regulation Q and let a few thrifts fail in 1966 
before the government moved in to protect the industry. I realize that it is a lot 
easier to talk here of playing chicken than to actually play, but that is why we 
pay central bankers such high salaries. 
The Fed’s response to the October 1987 crash was successful precisely be- 
cause it was well-tuned to the circumstances. The Fed reaffirmed its earlier 
sound precedents that it would provide liquidity to the markets as necessary. 
At the same time the Fed was successful in making clear that extra liquidity 
would remain only so long as necessary and would not lead to a change in the 
longer-run path of  monetary policy. No one was bailed out; many lost a lot 
and some securities firms went out of business but the financial system itself 
was protected. 
These comments bring me to an important issue neglected by all the authors 
of  our background papers. At least some of  the financial upsets we observe 
arise because the government is at war with itself. No one knows the impor- 
tance for last Friday’s [13 October 19891 market break of the position taken 
by  the Department of Transportation restricting the amount of foreign invest- 
ment in U.S. airlines, or of the wrangling in Congress over the capital gains 
tax, or of the dispute between the Treasury and the Fed over current monetary 
policy. Policy disputes occur all the time. The point I want to emphasize is 
that any policymaker who is unwilling to play chicken with the markets on the 
issues will be conceding a lot in Washington infighting over policy. This is 
another reason why it is so important to change the incentive structure in pri- 
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conflict  inevitably  brings surprises and disappointments to the markets. We 
need  to create an  economic and financial environment that is robust  to the 
normal course of governmental conflict. 
I  will  finish  with  a few comments on the foreign exchange market.  The 
managed float fails to provide the stability of either a credible fixed exchange 
rate system or of a freely floating system. Many exchange market uncertain- 
ties and instabilities are caused by unresolved policy conflicts over exchange 
market intervention and over monetary, fiscal, and trade policies.  The major 
problem at present is the effort to use sterilized intervention to influence the 
exchange rate. This situation will be unstable until the authorities face up to 
the  fact that  sterilized  intervention  makes little difference and that  the  ex- 
change  rate  can  be  influenced  only  through  monetary  and  fiscal  policy 
changes. 
The issue, then, is how far we should go in changing domestic policy to 
influence the exchange rate. In my view, it is terribly important, for the United 
States anyway, that there be no compromise of domestic stability for the pur- 
pose  of  attempting to  achieve an exchange rate target.  There is no conflict 
whatsoever between international objectives and domestic objectives; achiev- 
ing stability at home is the most important thing the United States can do to 
further the objective of international economic stability. The argument that we 
will have to pay increasing attention to the exchange market as the amount of 
foreign-owned  capital in the United States rises does not make good sense to 
me. U.S.-owned capital is just as mobile as foreign-owned  capital. Capital 
flows respond to relative  risks  and returns;  policy constraints  from interna- 
tional capital flows have changed little over the last decade. 
In  sum, while economists do not  have  a lot  to offer as yet in explaining 
market crises, we do have a lot to offer in explaining how to minimize the risk 
of  crises and how to deal with them in constructive ways. In both endeavors 
we  rely  on economic  fundamentals that  the profession  understands  pretty 
well. 
5. Paul A. Volcker 
Financial Crises and the Macroeconomy 
Martin Feldstein asked me to explain today why I was so worried about finan- 
cial crises, and I confess to some historical worries about them. I indeed think 
that the economy is becoming more crisis-prone, more overextended, as Ben 
Friedman suggested. However, we also have more and more devices for deal- 
ing with incipient crises-the  FDIC, the FSLIC and its successors, the Fed- 
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tools. This leaves me with the disturbing question of  whether by  using these 
tools repeatedly and aggressively we end up reinforcing the behavior patterns 
that aggravate the risk in the first place.  That is the dilemma that we face. I 
did not expect to find much sympathy for that point of view, but the back- 
ground papers at the conference seem to support it. Some people think that if 
the money supply is more or less stable,  then the lending officers will keep 
pouring  it out. However,  I will defend  the social utility  of worrying  about 
financial crises even in a friendly audience. 
Ben Friedman, Larry Summers, and Paul Krugman set out my case more 
eloquently than I can, and more impressively, and I do not want to repeat all 
of that. I think that they set out a vision of  what may be called the “stabiliza- 
tion” crisis, where there are no “right” answers, because the general tools that 
one uses to deal with the crisis, particularly  easing the money supply, may 
undermine  confidence.  Further, the international financial repercussions can 
lead to a depreciation of the dollar which feeds back to internal inflation. So 
all of these crises inevitably push the Federal Reserve toward an inflationary 
posture. I think that is the most likely scenario that one has to guard against in 
terms of the translation  of  actual and potential financial  crises into the real 
economy. 
I  woke up this morning  and had the Boston Globe delivered to my  hotel 
room, as the rest of  you did, and I was interested in the editorial page. After 
the 200 point drop in the stock market  on Friday  [13 October  19891, there 
were press reports about an anonymous Federal Reserve spokesman  saying 
that there would be an increase in the money supply as and when necessary 
over the weekend. Today there was a cartoon titled “Federal Reserve Issues 
Money  to Calm Nervous Markets.” It had  a caricature of  a dollar bill with 
President Bush on it, the name “United States of Amnesia,” and the slogan, 
“A penny leveraged is a penny earned.” Not only Federal Reserve chairmen, 
but  other people  as well, worry about this confidence effect translated  into 
external depreciation  and then giving rise to an inflationary  recession that is 
very difficult to deal with.  We  are not quite Argentina,  but I think the Latin 
American model is not irrelevant to concerns about how financial crises affect 
the real economy. 
During these remarks, however, let me mostly ignore the external dimen- 
sion in discussing my concerns about financial crises. How realistic are these 
concerns? Let us assume that we stabilize the money supply, which  is what 
everybody  says we ought to do in response to financial pressures.  The first 
question I have to ask is, “What money supply is being stabilized?’  That ques- 
tion sounds very easy after a crisis but is hard to answer during one. Say that 
the rule is high-powered  money, which is very fashionable with the Shadow 
Open Market Committee and many other monitors these days. By this rule, 
the Federal Reserve did a superb job in the Great Depression, and it is only in 
retrospect that one can say, “Well those dumb bunnies, why didn’t they rec- 
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intelligently?” Milton Friedman says that normally velocity is very stable, that 
it changes once every 40 years.  The question is, how can policymakers rec- 
ognize that change until the 40 years have gone by? I think it is very likely 
that with a severe financial crisis affecting confidence in the banking system, 
there would be quite different behavior between high-powered money, narrow 
measures of the money stock, and broad measures of the money stock. 
My second question is, “Even if  we could figure out exactly what money 
supply was right, does that solve the problem?’  I think what Larry Summers’s 
paper said was that the amount of  money needed to provide reassurance and 
to properly reduce real interest rates may be too much not only to stabilize the 
currency externally but to stabilize prices internally. That is a little bit what 
the cartoonist in the Boston Globe is worried about. There may be no correct 
answer as to what the money supply should be, or, at best, policymakers may 
be on a knife edge-if  they go a little too far they are inflating, and if they do 
too little they have a financial crisis translating into problems in the real econ- 
omy. If we are on the edge of a knife for too long-if  correct policy requires 
such fine and precise judgments over a period of time-then  it is not surpris- 
ing that mistakes will be made in one direction or another. Perfection is not in 
this world, and we will have a translation, therefore, of the financial pressures 
into problems in the real economy. 
Let me try to arrive at a little more constructive position as to how we can 
approach this problem by looking at a little bit of  experience.  In one case, I 
will  overlap what  Bill Poole said, and with  a slightly different  conclusion, 
which  shows that different  observers  can arrive  at different  answers. From 
1945 to roughly  1970, there was literally no worry about financial crises, that 
I am aware of, in this country or in most other countries. The system was very 
liquid, there was a lot of equity relative to debt, interest rates were low, and 
there were few real pressures. In my judgment, it did not make any difference 
whether we had deposit insurance or not in terms of  maintaining confidence 
in the banking system. 
That was first questioned in  1970 with the Penn Central crisis, which had 
two aspects. First, the judgment was made in the end by Hasbrett not to rescue 
Penn Central directly but to take the risk and let it go bankrupt. There was a 
lot of fear of letting this happen, though.  It is strange to think of a railroad 
being big, but in 1970 Penn Central was still a fairly important and diversified 
company,  and it had a lot of commercial  paper outstanding for those days. 
Whether it  should be  rescued  was debated  for two weeks,  and the owners 
almost  saved it with an extraordinary  interpretation of  Defense Department 
loan authorities. The second aspect was that the Federal Reserve issued a lot 
of reassuring statements and, I thought, eased policy a little bit. I differ from 
Bill a little bit  in thinking  that psychologically  they  overdid it. They did a 
little more than was necessary  to provide reassurance,  and I think they did 
create something of a precedent out of what was, in retrospect, a pretty limited 
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I say that with a certain humility, because as the financial system became 
more clearly overextended by the late 1970s, and I found myself as president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, I often said to myself, “What this 
country needs to shake us up and give us  a little discipline is a good bank 
failure. But please, God, not in my district.” I think that is the typical attitude 
of a regulator. My district became somewhat larger shortly thereafter. 
This brings me to the silver crisis in  1980 that people sometimes forget 
about.  This  crisis  broke  very  suddenly  in  its  financial  ramifications one 
Wednesday afternoon. The price of silver had fallen $38, and it seemed clear 
that if the price fell $2 more (as I recall), one of the leading brokerage houses 
in the United States, which held a lot of  uncovered silver positions, would 
have to close its doors and go bankrupt. That firm would have failed to meet 
its capital requirements with the SEC and probably would have failed to meet 
its obligations more generally. We  had great emergency meetings and all of 
the confusion normal in government, and whether by  good judgment or by 
failure to make a decision, we decided not to have a “circuit breaker” in the 
form of closing the markets, which was of  doubtful legality in any event. So 
the markets stayed open, the price stayed $1 above the critical point, the bro- 
kerage house liquidated its position, and shortly thereafter it reported record 
earnings for the quarter, which galled me. There was really no official action 
taken except a blessing afterward by the Federal Reserve of  a consolidation 
loan in the banking system. 
What was at stake in this situation? There was the big brokerage house 
immediately and another, even larger, brokerage house that would have been 
in trouble with a drop in price of a few more dollars, all after a $38 decline. 
There was at least one large money market bank that was heavily exposed in 
silver directly, and others who, because of the silver speculation, were consid- 
ered (not today, but in the context of those days) to have impaired capital. The 
rest of the scenario was never played out and not much was done in fact by the 
government,  except  blessing this consolidation loan,  which  seemed fairly 
straightforward. We  went on to the next crisis more or less happily. 
The next crisis, I think, was Penn Square, and then the rescue of the depos- 
itors and creditors of Continental Illinois in  1984 that was discussed earlier. 
What was the rationale for that reaction? Well, at that point there was concern 
about a systemic crisis, because the banking system in general was commonly 
understood to have some weak assets in various directions, including most 
explicitly Latin American loans. Having a big bank’s depositors lose money 
was judged to present too large a risk to the rest of the banking system and too 
large a risk to the real economy, to which I will return in a moment. Further, 
this crisis occurred during the ongoing international debt crisis (which began 
in  1982), a crisis that could have impaired the capital of all of  the  10 or so 
leading banks in the United States and most of the leading banks in the rest of 
the world. Was  that a situation that really justified what would have indeed 
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enough to simply maintain  the money supply of the United States and other 
countries, let the banks take their losses, and go on about our business? What 
would have happened? 
Well, it is very hard to describe what would happen in these counterfactual 
situations. There would have been very low interest rates for very high grade 
pieces of paper, but the real question is what would have happened to the kind 
of lending activity, and indeed in the stock market itself, that really drives the 
economy over a period  of time.  I  think that the risk premiums would have 
been enormous on private paper of all kinds and particularly of greater matu- 
rity. Consider the complaints that I hear from Texans about the banking system 
in Texas following the rescue (or in another sense, the debacle) of the Texas 
savings and loan system. The complaints are that the banks and savings and 
loans had lubricated the growth of  Texas, and today people cannot get credit. 
Credit is unavailable because everybody is scared to death after going through 
a crisis or potential crisis that was resolved favorably from the standpoint of 
the depositor,  most lending officers,  and almost everybody except the stock- 
holders of the institution.  If that kind of crisis had occurred on a wider scale, 
would the resulting  climate have supported continuing  economic activity in 
the fairly regular way that we have seen in recent years? I doubt it, but I think 
the mechanism would have been very high risk premiums, not all of which 
can be captured in interest rates with some refusal to lend for private credit. 
Finally,  let  me discuss the stock  market crash in  1987. There was great 
concern about the wealth effects of the crash, and the Federal Reserve reaction 
was to provide some assurance of  liquidity in the economy. I would say, not 
so unexpectedly,  that this potential  crisis was reasonably  well absorbed and 
did not really affect the continuing growth in the economy. The wealth effects 
were offset by monetary and other changes. I think that the central reason this 
potential  crisis did not develop more fully is that there was no institutional 
discontinuity in the crash. In this way, the crash was similar to the silver crisis 
in 1980 but different from other potential financial problems. 
After the  crash  a  leading banker  asked,  “Where was  the blood  on the 
street?’  which  I think  was apropos. A  lot of  stockholders  lost money-en- 
dowment funds, universities, and individuals. However, they are not the kind 
of  people who create a systemic problem in the financial system. In contrast, 
there is quite a different potential for crisis when one thinks about banks and 
the interconnections between banks, because then not only is the money sup- 
ply at stake, but also the payments system, transfers of credit, and the whole 
lending apparatus. 
What are the implications  of this distinction  for policy?  I think that what 
we have said in the past  is that we must protect  the core of  the depository 
system, using the FDIC, the FSLIC, and the Federal Reserve as the lender of 
last resort. It is important that the protected part of the system be big enough, 
be a critical mass, to maintain  stability  in  the system, but it is not good to 
protect everybody in the whole system. We make a choice as to what to pro- 
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banking system. Some of the discussion this morning was about how to ac- 
complish that. I believe that we need to restore a greater sense of risk then we 
have had recently,  but obviously we need that greater sense of risk within a 
structure of  stability and resiliency-and  it is awfully easy to say that and 
awfully hard to do. 
On  a practical  level,  it is appropriate  to emphasize capital,  as was men- 
tioned this morning. There could be a much larger role for subordinated debt, 
which  was also discussed earlier. I would like to see some experimentation 
with marginal coinsurance for bigger deposits. I do not think that this coinsur- 
ance can be  very  substantial,  but it ought to be possible to at least put the 
interest earned at risk. Then maybe, if  we became progressively  bolder and 
the system seemed to improve in  stability, we could consider insuring only 
99% or 95% of the deposit. I think that if  we moved much below that, we 
might  as well  not insure  it at all, because  the depositor  will  act as if  it is 
uninsured.  We could insist upon deposit of  preference so that we get some 
discipline from other creditors, and there are a variety of devices of this sort. 
I think also that we need some reinvigoration of regulation and supervision 
to the extent that it affects safety and soundness. I wonder, however, whether 
that is really a lesson for the 1950s and the  1960s rather than for the future. 
Can we exercise very careful supervision when people can be something very 
close to a bank without calling themselves a bank and being regulated like a 
bank? Or when international movement of bonds and international competi- 
tion among financial institutions is as pervasive as it is now? Being successful 
in regulation and supervision requires pretty good agreement among a number 
of key countries, and the evidence is mixed on that possibility. We have taken 
a step to provide  uniform  capital requirements,  which,  looked at from one 
direction, is quite an achievement for the first time. Looked at from another 
direction, though, these  capital  requirements  are the easiest,  simplest,  and 
most straightforward thing on which to get international agreement. What are 
the prospects for achieving the more diffuse and sophisticated kind of  super- 
vision that is probably required if we adopt this philosophy of focusing protec- 
tion on the banking and depository system rather than on the rest of the mar- 
kets? We need to move to a stable financial system partly  so that monetary 
policy itself can be free to act more in response to concerns about inflation 
and the stability of the currency instead of in defense of the financial system 
itself. 
Summary of Discussion 
Summers began by discussing the current views of some financial market par- 
ticipants affected by the crash of 1987. First, they report little change in their 
investment behavior. Second, they report that they paid out money during the 
crash before being paid themselves and were lucky not to lose their shirts as a 180  Summary of Discussion 
result. It is a bad sign for the future of the payments system that they say they 
will  not  act that way  again. Summers continued  by  contrasting  two views 
about the role of  monetary policy and the value of the dollar in spurring the 
1987 crash. Many economists believe that high U.S. interest rates designed to 
maintain an arbitrary level of the exchange rate reduced liquidity in the finan- 
cial markets  and led to the crash. The opposing  interpretation of events in 
1987 is that a fear of the dollar going into a free fall led to the crash. 
Bennett T McCallum raised two questions concerning the scenario analysis 
used in Summers’s paper. First, does the lender of last resort need to use the 
discount window to direct loans to particular banks, or is it enough to control 
the magnitude of some monetary aggregate or interest rate? Second, is it ap- 
propriate to analyze events and policies during a crisis, in the design of policy, 
or must one study ongoing processes? 
Robert E.  Hall remarked that, as a general matter, governments turn social- 
ist in crises, including for example the U.S. government’s planned economic 
strategy after a nuclear attack. He believes that monetary policy is central to a 
free-market response to a financial crisis, but the Federal Reserve should not 
attempt to stabilize  any particular  monetary  aggregate.  Instead they  should 
adjust monetary  policy to maintain the same consensus forecast of  nominal 
GNP (for one to two years in the future) as before the crash. In the 1987 crash, 
for example, the consensus forecast fell slightly but not by  much, due to a 
vigorous  monetary  response.  This policy  has several advantages.  First,  the 
consensus forecast  adjusts  quickly  to current  events,  as opposed  to actual 
nominal GNP, which adjusts to both crises and monetary policy with a sub- 
stantial lag. Second, the proposed policy would generate a big surge in liquid- 
ity during a crisis, but it does to require intervention on behalf of any particu- 
lar institutions. Finally, a nominal GNP target is inherently noninflationary. 
Poole wondered what would happen to the economy if forecasts were based 
on the assumption that the Federal Reserve would take some action that it does 
not in fact take. Hull replied that this uncertainty would be quickly resolved 
due to the short feedback loop. 
Friedman responded to Hall that there is no more reason to think there will 
be  an  informative  consensus forecast than to think  that there is one useful 
measure of the money supply. 
Alan A. Walters described the background of a possible currency crisis in 
Britain. From 1981 to 1986, British monetary policy maintained a growth rate 
of the monetary base between 2.5 and 5 percent. In  1987, policy switched to 
targeting the exchange rate, particularly in the Deutschmark-pound rate. Ster- 
ilized intervention was used in an attempt to offset the pressure for a pound 
appreciation but it failed. The exchange rate was contained only by lowering 
interest rates from 11 or 12 percent in early 1987 to about 7.5 percent in 1988. 
Inflationary  pressures and resulting monetary tightening have since raised in- 
terest rates to roughly 15 percent today. 
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is  a  significant moral hazard  problem  for  monetary  policymakers.  An  in- 
creased probability of the Labor party winning the election will lead to more 
capital flight and downward pressure on the pound. The government will have 
to raise interest rates to prop up the pound, thereby increasing the probability 
of a recession and thus the probability of the Labor party winning the election. 
But this worsens the capital flight and so on. An attempt to peg the currency, 
in this political environment, risks generating a fierce monetary squeeze and 
a severe recession. 
Samuelson warned the group not to be misled by the monetary policy suc- 
cesses of  Paul Volcker in 1982 and Alan Greenspan in 1987, which he attrib- 
uted to the “genius” of the Federal Reserve Chairmen. 
Robert J. Gordon argued that the United States has recently  conducted a 
controlled experiment of wild  dollar gyrations and found, contrary to Sum- 
mers’s scenario, that the effect on domestic inflation  was minimal.  He cau- 
tioned that this experience may not be generalizable to other economies,  be- 
cause U.S. imports have distribution systems that buffer the effect on prices of 
exchange rate changes. He concluded  that monetary policy  in crises should 
focus on domestic  targets and not worry about international effects. Gordon 
contended that the virtues of nominal GNP targeting are irrelevant to the mi- 
croeconomic allocation and intervention issues of the conference. 
Kindleberger  noted  that  not  all  crises are alike, and different  policy  re- 
sponses are needed at different times. He agreed with Volcker and Krugman 
that contagion crises are the critical problem; nominal GNP targeting does not 
address this issue. 
Mussa discussed the “non-crisis” of the financial system in late  1981 and 
early 1982, during which high interest rates left the banking system liquid but 
insolvent on a market-value basis.  Because a major failure at that time could 
have produced a run on the system, policymakers would have had to put out 
any “brush fires” that occurred. Luckily, no serious fires broke out until the 
Federal Reserve’s anti-inflation credibility was established in 1982. 
Krugman commented to Hall that society intervenes in free markets during 
crises to prevent massive income distribution effects, even though efficiency 
suffers as a result. Hall responded  that the beneficiaries  of the  Continental 
Illinois bailout were at the top of the income distribution. 
Robert D.  Reischauer emphasized the important role of political dynamics 
in dealing with failing financial and nonfinancial institutions. The interests of 
these  institutions  will  be  defended  by  the political  representatives  for  their 
geographic locations. 
Hall reminded  the group that  a nominal GNP targeting procedure would 
have produced  a more expansionary monetary  policy  in October  1987 than 
was actually pursued.  This is a consistent framework of monetary policy that 
responds  to crises effectively  and thereby  reduces the risk of  “brush  fires.” 
Further, it is “uncanny” how government bailouts go to the rich. 
Syron pointed out that the income distribution effects of institutional bail- 182  Summary of Discussion 
outs depend critically on the importance of contagion in the economy. If the 
real economy falters, then people at the bottom of the income distribution are 
the most likely to lose jobs. 
Summers  concluded  the  session  by  stating  that  the  cost of  not  fighting 
“brush fires” probably exceeds the cost of fighting them excessively. In partic- 
ular,  the  allocative  inefficiency  resulting  from intervention is much  smaller 
than the output loss from a slowdown in the real economy. Further, the argu- 
ment  against  bailouts  depends on being  entirely  credible  that  one will  not 
engage in such bailouts,  which is a difficult point to make convincingly.  Fi- 
nally, reputational externalities clearly exist in precarious financial situations, 
so contagion can be an important problem that is not internalized by individ- 
ual firms. 